The official also falsified compliance records and was paid to provide qualification certificates to individuals who had not completed the required training.

Details of the officer's corrupt conduct are outlined in an investigation report prepared for the minister of justice by watchdog agency the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity and made public this month by the commission.

The report described how the official - referred to as Officer A - recruited clients to his consulting business through his official duties as a food import inspector.

"Officer A did not seek permission from the Agriculture Department for secondary employment, or otherwise declare to it a financial interest...despite the general duty to avoid conflicts of interest which applied to all public officials," Integrity Commissioner Michael Griffin wrote in the report.

Across a five-year span the consulting business made almost $190,000 in gross revenue.

One of its services was to help food businesses navigate the accreditation process required before they could legally import material subject to quarantine.

Investigators found that, on two occasions, Officer A personally completed this training under his clients' names.

"Having considered these issues, I am satisfied that Officer A used inside knowledge of the Agriculture Department's processes to circumvent the department's oversight of food importation businesses," Mr Griffin wrote.

"Consequently, Australia's biosecurity arrangements were left vulnerable to compromise."

The Agriculture Department and Australia's wider border force have been plagued by corruption scandals in recent years.

In 2016 police arrested biosecurity officer Richard Vong in connection with his alleged links to organised crime.

In 2012 the federal police and ACLEI charged a Sydney based biosecurity official in connection to allegations she helped a cell of drug trafficking customs officers at Sydney Airport

The investigation into Officer A also revealed other instances of potentially corrupt conduct, such as drafting fake agreements without clients' knowledge in order to meet biosecurity compliance requirements.

"I make no inference that the businesses that obtained services from Officer A did so with any knowledge of the impropriety of these actions," Mr Griffin found.

"Indeed, it is entirely possible that Officer A's official status may have left each of them with the impression they had complied with the law."

Circumventing Australia's stringent biosecurity regulations in this manner could have had a devastating impact on the primary sector, the investigation concluded.

"This investigation demonstrates the commercial value of official information and insider knowledge, and illustrates the prospect that corrupt officers can exploit their status as public officials to obtain an unfair financial benefit.

"Circumventing training processes and falsifying official documents left a number of businesses and individuals without the knowledge or skill to treat potentially serious biosecurity risks.

"In different circumstances, the impact could have been devastating for Australian agriculture."

The investigation - termed Operation Karoola - was initiated in 2014 after the Agriculture Department notified the Integrity Commissioner of a potential corruption issue involving Officer A.

Officer A was subsequently charged and convicted on two counts of abusing public office and one count of passing off a forged document to Commonwealth officials as genuine.

The officer was stood down in May 2014 and resigned from the department in January 2015.

"ACLEI has provided the department with an assessment of corruption risks and vulnerabilities in practices and procedures that were identified through operation Karoola and related investigations," the report concluded.

"The Agriculture Secretary is considering that information as part of a broader review of integrity arrangements."

In 2015, during a wide-ranging overhaul, the Senate passed a bill which established an "inspector general" position responsible for independently overseeing the government's biosecurity arrangements.