The brass, both old and new, fear the success of the first Super Hornet purchase makes a second buy politically appealing - even though the less capable Boeing F/A 18s cost more than their far stealthier Lockheed Martin F-35 counterparts. ''Mr Smith is known as a ditherer,'' one retired RAAF officer said. ''If he went out and bought (more) Super Hornets it would show he could make a decision.''

The trouble is, according to industry sources and Defence, while the Super Hornet is a good plane it is not ''an acceptable F-35 substitute''. ''The Super Hornet (which carries its weapon load under the wings and not internally like the JSF) only has low observability if it is not armed and dangerous,'' one aerospace industry marketer said.

''What is it going to do - scare you to death?'' A Defence spokesman was more tactful. ''A comparison of the flyaway cost of the 14 JSFs and the (24) F/A 18s is not feasible as one (the JSF) is a fifth generation fighter and the other (the Super Hornet) is a 4.5 generation fighter. The Super Hornet does not have the same level of capability as a fifth generation stealth aircraft.'' Even the JSF's most entrenched critics - the folks from Air Power Australia - concede the F-35 is a better air superiority fighter than the Super Hornet. A controversial simulation described by a joint APA-RepSim delegation to a high level parliamentary defence committee on Tuesday asserted a hypothetical 2018 clash between 240 Super Hornets and 240 PRC Sukhoi SU35s over Taiwan would result in all the American planes being splashed by the mainland Chinese. In contrast, given the same scenario, 30 of the JSFs would live to fight another day.

Defence and industry sources point to Smith's rhetoric in the wake of a recent US decision to push orders for up to 179 JSFs five to six years ''to the right'' as evidence he is veering away from the three-year-old white paper commitment which has underpinned significant investments by numerous small to medium Australian defence manufacturing enterprises in the multi-national F-35 program.

''The Air Combat Capability Review concluded that a fleet of around 100 fifth generation multi-role combat aircraft would provide Australia with an effective and flexible air combat capability to (at least) 2030,'' the White Paper states. ''A further judgment of the review was that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the preferred solution for that requirement. The Government has decided that it will acquire around 100 JSFs along with supporting systems and weapons.''

On January 30, Smith said: ''US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, the purchaser of the largest number of JSFs, has made it clear in recent days that he is examining his schedule of purchase. We're doing likewise so far as those (next) 12 aircraft are concerned.'' Smith said Australia was only ''legally bound, contractually bound'' to purchasing the two JSFs due to be delivered in the US for training purposes in 2014. The pair are the first instalment on a batch of 14 Australia has said it would buy with a view to delivery from 2014 through to 2017. ''We will now make a judgment about whether the timetable for the second tranche - the 12 - remains on the current timetable.''

While Panetta argues his decision - which does not reduce the number of planes the Pentagon intends to buy over the life of the program - is intended to prevent the need for costly rectification work further down the track, the reality is the delays are intended to help achieve more than $487 billion in US Defence spending cuts over the next decade. Resident Canberra cynics have suggested if Australian deferrals are timed appropriately they could help the Gillard Government meet its own budget targets as well.

One irony surely not lost on Lockheed Martin is that by slowing down its F-35 acquisition schedule the US Government now has to accept at least part ownership of some of the cost increases and schedule slips critics such as Senator John McCain have been railing against for years.

Smith has repeatedly talked up the additional Super Hornets option, seemingly choosing to ignore strong advice the best way to combat a short term capability gap arising from any further delays in the JSF program would be to extend the life of the existing ''Classic'' Hornet fleet. ''Although we haven't come to any conclusion, the Super Hornet is an obvious example or obvious option to contemplate,'' he said.

A life extension program for the ''Classic'' Hornets has been described as ''the least bad option'' by senior Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Andrew Davies and is supported by former chief of air force and now Williams Foundation spokesman, Air Marshal (ret) Errol McCormack. It has also been endorsed by sources close to Lockheed Martin. ''The only justification for a second Super Hornet tranche would be a catastrophic failure of the JSF program resulting from a natural disaster that saw Fort Worth (the site of the production line) sink into the earth,'' we were told. ''In the event of minor delays is the Australian Government really going to spend billions of dollars for a few months of bridging capability?''

Defence told Forum it had spent $129 million - or just $20 million more than the price of a single Super Hornet - on platform sustainment costs for the 70-odd ''Classic'' Hornets in 2010-2011. Even factoring in the cost of additional life extension work to carry at least some of the planes through to beyond 2020 this figure is not expected to blow out by a significant amount annually. A spokesman said the drawdown of the ''Classic'' Hornet fleet - the planes Australia initially acquired in the late 1980s to replace the 1960s-era Mirages - is to be ''aligned'' with the transition to the JSF.

Ministerial caution in relation to the JSF project has reached such a level that on Tuesday a Defence spokeswoman refused to confirm a recommendation for the purchase of an additional 58 JSFs would be sent to the Minister before the end of the year. This is despite it being public knowledge a Defence Materiel Organisation team has been working to this end for years. According to industry sources the only ''real'' decision point for Smith in 2012 is what to do when the proposal for the next 58 planes lobs on his desk - possibly around September or October.

The answer, according to the experts, is that it is a no-brainer. The brass, including former chief of defence force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, current CDF General David Hurley, former chief of air force and now deputy CDF Air Marshal Mark Binskin and current chief of air force Air Marshal Geoff Brown, have repeatedly said Australia must have a fifth generation stealth fighter. They all agree, given it is inconceivable Australia would ever buy a Russian or Chinese plane, the F-35 is the only option available.

McCormack is of a like mind. He says the RAAF's ability to stay at the forefront of aviation technology has given Australia the best air force in the region for more than half a century. ''The Australian Government needs to hold its nerve,'' he said. ''A fleet of F-35s would give Australia an unsurpassed ability to shape and control events in our region. In the Williams Foundation's judgment it would be sensible to wait and see what happens with the F-35 while simultaneously investigating the cost of capability issues involved in maintaining the ''Classic'' Hornet beyond 2020. An interim force structure based on 24 Super Hornets and up to 71 ''Classic'' Hornets would still be world-class for the next decade.''

The White Paper identified the Super Hornets as a relatively short term transition capability not dissimilar to the F-4 Phantoms leased for the RAAF between late 1970 and mid 1973 while Defence was waiting for operational F-111s. And, most significantly, the first 24 Super Hornets did not eat into the resources set aside for JSF acquisition. They were funded, at least in part, by savings from the early retirement of the ageing, and expensive to maintain and operate, F-111 fleet.

In 2009/2010 - the last full year of F-111 operations - the average sustainment cost (not including fuel, bombs and rockets, wages and infrastructure overheads) was just under $41,000 an hour Defence figures indicate. This had soared to almost $63,000 an hour in the last six months of F-111 operations.

The Super Hornets, while an excellent short term replacement for the problematic F-111 strike bomber capacity, appear markedly more expensive on a plane-for-plane basis than the JSFs. To upgrade the 12 Australian planes preconfigured for electronic warfare to full F/A-18G ''growler'' capability would make them more expensive still.

To buy, arm, sustain and operate the first 24 Super Hornets is expected to cost $6 billion over 10 years. Of this, $2.6 billion was spent on the planes themselves at an average of about $108million each. A further $1.4 billion - or $140million a year - is to be spent on Super Hornet sustainment over the first decade the fleet is in being. The remaining $2 billion is being spent on support infrastructure, spare parts, bombs and missiles and weapons systems. On those figures an additional 24 Super Hornets would cost another $2.6 billion. Taken to Fort Worth the same amount of money would get you 27 JSFs, a pretty good steak dinner and matching claret with program manager Tom Burbage and enough change for a cab fare to the South American people's paradise of your choice.

The Australian Government approved $3billion - which included provision for cost overruns - for 14 JSFs and support kit in 2009. The average ''flyaway price'' for each of the first 14 JSFs, according to Defence, is about $95million. This adds up to a total of $1.33 billion for the planes alone.

It is not known how much, if anything, the Federal Government would recoup for its used Super Hornets if it went to dispose of them in the mid to late 2020s. ''The disposal plan for the Super Hornets has not yet been determined,'' the Defence spokesman said.

Older RAAF veterans are very mindful of two acquisition decisions, one dating back more than half a century, that seem startlingly relevant to the current Super Hornet vs JSF debate. One was the decision not to wait for the brilliant American Sabre as the replacement for the venerable WWII-era Mustangs in the early 1950s and the other was to stay the course with the troubled F-111 program in the late 1960s. The Meteor, while not a total disaster, saw Australian pilots sent into battle in Korea against technically superior Soviet-built MiGs in a jet whose origins could be traced back to before 1939. Little better than the propeller-driven Mustangs in aerial combat, Meteors rarely claimed a victory in a dog fight. When the jets did meet, the North Korean planes invariably scored the bulk of the kills and good pilots were lost as a result.

The F-111, by contrast, rose above its early controversies over cost, schedule and capability - many of which are eerily reminiscent of the current F-35 debate - to become one of the most successful planes the RAAF ever operated. The ''pig'' was in continuous service from 1973 until December 2010 - a remarkable 37 years which included a spy-flight over the Franklin Dam at the behest of Senator Gareth ''Biggles'' Evans in 1983.

In this instance patience proved a virtue and virtue was its own reward. Advocates of the F-35 argue that given time history might well repeat.

David Ellery is The Canberra Times' Defence Reporter