Three distinctive features of Kevin Rudd’s approach to government are likely to dominate in 2009. One is that he is extremely reluctant to chop senior officials who perform badly, yet eager to set up more coordinating committees to improve their performance. Secondly, he is happy to announce big decisions, regardless of whether they meet his commitment to evidence based policy. Thirdly, he repeatedly undermines his chances of meeting commendable objectives by continuing a handout mentality fostered by the Howard government.
The first characteristic is highlighted by the report released just before Christmas by a retired NSW Supreme Court judge John Clarke on the wrongful charging of Mohamed Haneef. After Haneef was charged in Brisbane in mid-2007 with recklessly assisting a terrorist organisation, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police Mick Keelty assured the nation that the investigation had been “driven by the evidence and driven by the facts”. Clarke’s report clearly demonstrated that it wasn’t — there was no evidence of Haneef assisting terrorists.
In a reversal of the normal situation in which head strong investigators get carried away and have to be restrained by senior officers, the two detectives who led the inquiry, federal agent Neil Thompson and the Queensland force’s Sergeant Adam Simms, correctly refused to charge Haneef because of a lack of evidence. But they there overruled by the AFP's Commander Ramzi Jabbour whom Clarke said had lost perspective and objectivity. Ultimately, it is Keelty who should take responsibly, particularly as he had assured the public that everything was based on the evidence.
Responding to the report, the Attorney General Robert McClelland said the mistakes were “totally unacceptable” and revealed a “lack of appropriate direction from the leadership of several agencies”. Yet McClelland said he retained full confidence in Keelty who led the key agency that made totally unacceptable mistakes. Even if McClelland wanted to do otherwise, Rudd would not let him. Rudd is hardly blameless in jumping to conclusions. As soon as the charges were laid Rudd, who was the then Opposition leader, rushed out a statement strongly inferring that Haneef was guilty while heaping praise on the AFP for a job well done.
Unlike the AFP, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s behaviour was exemplary. It had full access to the same information as the AFP, yet quickly concluded that Haneef posed no threat to security in Australia or elsewhere. These views were put in writing to the highest levels of the Howard government, but were dismissed. Although ASIO is nation's premier counter-terrorism agency, Clarke expressed surprise that no serious attempt was made to assess whether it was correct.
Clarke recorded that the then chairman of the National Counter Terrorism Committee Duncan Lewis noted the discrepancies, but declined an offer from ASIO to explain its reasons for rejecting the AFP’s conclusions. This hardly inspires confidence, yet Rudd recently appointed Lewis as the nation’s first National Security Adviser.
In the wake of the Clarke report, Rudd will establish a new thicket of government administrative arrangements to try to better coordinate the activities of the security agencies and departments. A lack of coordination was never the problem in the Haneef case. Ample coordination procedures were already in place. The problem is that the AFP is badly run and that senior public servants failed to heed the accurate advice from ASIO. Improvements are unlikely without a change at the top of the AFP and the national security advisory tree.
Although Rudd promised to adopt evidence based policy, he makes decisions with scant evidentiary basis when it suits. He announced on December 22 that Holden would be given $149 million from the government’s
green car fund to build a new four-cylinder car in Adelaide. This might help retain jobs, but why pretend the money is for a green car when plenty of other models already have better fuel efficiency and lower greenhouse gas emissions.
A potentially more costly example is Rudd’s announcement in September that he wants a bigger navy, although the new white paper on the future structure of the defence force is still nothing like finished. If Rudd has convincing evidence that more ships are the most cost effective way to enhance Australia’s defence, he hasn’t provided it.
As 2008 came to a close, the Finance minister Lindsay Tanner announced that his
“razor gang” was working on cutting fat from next’s May’s budget. It will need to do a better job than in the last budget which cut worthwhile spending on the CSIRO and the statistics and meteorological bureaus, yet extended John Howard’s “one off” handouts to the well-off before the 2007 election.
Tanner went missing in action before the government announced its $10.4 billion economic stimulus package in October. While a stimulus was undoubtedly justified, Rudd’s package ignored options that could deliver ongoing economic benefits without having to wait for big infrastructure projects to kick in.
Instead, most of the spending comprised big handouts of little lasting benefit. Its only legacy will be to encourage demands for more handouts in the May 2009 budget. Until Rudd agrees to stop chucking money away on middle class welfare, he won’t be able to achieve his goals an education revolution.