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Turning a trading saviour into a foe

A disturbing gulf has opened up between Australia and the US over defence policy. Few suggest the US takes potential threats lightly. But it has a far less hawkish view of China than policy makers in the Australian defence department and cabinet who have rejected expert advice from intelligence agencies whose job is to assess likely threats. The Defence Intelligence Organisation and the Office of National Assessments have reached the same conclusion as their US counterparts and the Pentagon — China’s military posture is defensive and the spending on its armed forces is a normal outcome of a growing economy.

The clearest sign that the Pentagon does not regard China as serious potential threat is that it has just scrapped plans to buy more F-22 fighters that are much better at air-to-air combat than anything China is likely to possess in the foreseeable future. But the extremely expensive F-22 can’t attack ground targets, so it’s not been used in the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. President Barack Obama's defence secretary, Robert Gates, who held the same job in the Bush administration, wants equipment that meets America’s future needs. According to the US intelligence community, which Gates earlier headed, future threats are likely to arise from unconventional conflicts rather than high intensity wars against nation states like China.

As a result, Gates has cancelled future orders for the F22; and scrapped a new manned bomber due to arrive in 2018 and a next generation cruiser (the CGX). Gates wants more pilotless planes for surveillance and ground attack and is going ahead with the Joint Strike Fighter that might suit Australia defence needs. Some of Gates’ decisions may be overturned in the congress where production lines are often kept alive in particular congressional districts.

But his general theme that the US shouldn't be preoccupied with defeating China in a full-scale war makes sense. The US is at a strategic disadvantage because it will rely on China to fund its budget and current account deficits for many years. Nor is it realistic to expect that the US could successfully invade China against tough resistance from tens of millions of people.

US and Australian intelligence agencies assess Chinese leaders as likely to be remain heavily focused on keeping their potentially fractious population happy. China will continue to modernise its military forces. But these forces are assessed as primarily intended to defend against what the leadership sees as a potentially hostile encirclement by US, Japanese, Indian, South Korean, and Australian forces. The balance will remain very much against China for decades. DIO estimates that China's military spending is about one tenth of that of the US alone. The Pentagon estimates the figure is around one fifth.

Yet Australia’s forthcoming defence white paper reportedly sees danger signs in Chinese efforts to develop an over-the-horizon radar capability that Australia has possessed for many years. The white paper’s main author, a defence department deputy secretary Mike Pezzullo, is convinced he is right to portray China as a potential threat requiring an hefty Australian military build up, particularly by the navy, at a cost of $100 billion over the next decade. Unsurprisingly, he is backed by the military brass who rarely reject advanced new equipment.

Last week, however, The Australian reported that senior officials had visited Washington last year to seek support for the white paper’s “hawkish” stance on China, but were rebuffed by the Pentagon and the CIA. The Australian also reported that top defence officials exerted such strong pressure on DIO to change its relatively benign assessment of China that the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Ian Carnell investigated whether the intelligence agency’s independence had been compromised.

The white paper is not expected to explain why China would want to go the immense trouble and expense of attacking Australia when it would be much cheaper to keep buying Australian exports. If anything, its ready access to supplies of Australian commodities provides China with a strong motive to maintain a peaceful, and mutually profitable, relationship.

However, the white paper is expected to argue that a relative increase in Chinese power in the region would increase “strategic competition”. Maybe it would, but that's a long way from saying that China would be in a position to attack Australia, even if it wanted to. But Kevin Rudd has pushed hard for the naval build-up recommended by the white paper, including big new surface ships and submarines that he wants to help contain China. Unfortunately, the new surface ships will be death traps, easily sunk by the sort of missiles available to China, Australia and many other countries.

No one is saying that circumstances can’t change. China, India, or Japan could present a problem 30 or more years from now — or all be closer friends of Australia than the US. But it makes little sense to guess what force structure would be needed that far away. Better to retain the scope for a flexible response as a clearer picture emerges.

Unfortunately, the white paper’s strategy represents a return to the discredited “forward defence” doctrine that coalition governments started to abandon in the late 1960s. Apart from been out of step with Australia’s major ally and our own intelligence agencies, the strategy is also at odds with the findings of the white paper’s own community consultation process headed by a former Labor senator Stephen Loosley. Loosley said last week, “Australians are cautious but there is no culpable sense that China is emerging as a threat or strategic adversary. China is seen more in terms of being an economic partner." Contrary the thrust of the white paper, Loosley said, “The notion of the yellow peril is probably 40 to 50 years out of date."

The consultative panel found that many participants regarded climate change as the "greatest emerging threat" to the country's security. Most people were happy with current defence spending of about $22 billion a year, rather than wanting to spend more. But Rudd is committed to far larger increases in spending on new weapons systems than on low emissions technologies to tackle global warming.

There is much to admire about the US, but great powers rise and fall. No one knows whether China's economic and military strength will continue to grow. If it does, there is no reason why adroit diplomacy, backed by prudent outlays on defence, should not allow Australia to retain good relations with China and the US.

But it would help if Rudd diverted a tiny slice of the military budget to restore the $60 million he has cut from the diplomatic service. Australia would also be more secure if he adopted Gates’ focus on long range pilotless planes rather than squandering billons of floating coffins.

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Brian Toohey’s article is riddled with lacunae that could be dismantled point by point. But in the interests of space a few comments might offer some balance. Firstly, intelligence agencies provide intelligence and assessments for decision-makers. They are not the decision-makers, and are not necessarily privy to all the factors that are weighed in the balance in reaching decisions about defence force requirements. That said, they would be more informed than members of the community who were consulted by Senator Loosley who display “no culpable (sic) sense that China is an emerging threat”. Secondly, Australian defence force development decisions are based on existing or planned capability in the region rather than on intent - which can change rapidly. It is in this context (responding to Toohey’s claim) that Mike Pezzullo might consider Chinese efforts to develop an over-the-horizon radar as having significant implications. Third, the maritime (sea and air) environment is the first line of Australian defence, and it would hardly be surprising if the White Paper focused on the need for defence force development in this arena. Fourth, the US may well “have a far less hawkish view of China than policy makers in the Australian defence department and cabinet” because they have higher priorities, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea. And, the global financial crisis which began and seems to be impacting on the US far more than on any other country is also a major distraction – and the US response is largely underpinned by Chinese credit. And, to suggest that the US’ decision not to buy more F-22 fighters is an indication of the US’ view of China as a potential threat is patently illogical. Notwithstanding the above, I would support more funding for Australia’s diplomatic service.
Posted by Steve Hyland, 20/04/2009 6:15:39 PM
Steve, As I said job of the intelligence agencies is to provide advice. Government decide policy. In reality, governments don't look solely at capability in the region. They also pay attention to presumed intent down the track. Otherwise we would have a force structure to counter the capabilities of Japan, India, South Korea, the US etc, as well as China. If the white paper is to respond to China's proposed acquisition of an over-the-horizon capability, perhaps China is responding to our earlier acquisition of the same capability, then it can respond to our response. — that's the stuff of which arms races are made. There is nothing illogical about the comment on the f-22.

Brian Toohey

Posted by Brian Toohey, 21/04/2009 4:36:06 PM
Brian, is there a chance that Kevin Rudd is trying to play down the view held by some that he is too close to China? One thing I am not sure is if this China-offensive white paper has the attention of the general public. If so, it would make good PR alignment, I suppose, at least amid media frenzy.
Posted by TrnOvrANwLeaf, 24/04/2009 4:00:19 PM
TrnOvrANwLeaf. That is what some observers close to Rudd believe. The White Paper's strategic rationale is due out soon. It will need to be better than the anticipated claim that "strategic competition" in the region is likely to increase. The WP should, but won't, give a cost effectiveness comparison of the array of weapons systems it wants to buy.

Brian Toohey

Posted by Brian Toohey, 27/04/2009 2:09:33 PM
Brian Toohey
Brian Toohey, one of Australia's most respected journalists, examines various matters of import.
S Defence Secretary Robert Gates
S Defence Secretary Robert Gates

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