The brief time frame given to the review suggests it will be neither reflective nor genuinely independent. It is likely that much of what it will recommend was decided some time ago; at least in principle if not in detail. It stretches credulity to believe that a handful of commission members, in just a few months, can divine more wisdom about efficiency in public administration than could the Coalition, which has had six years to prepare for its first term in office. Notably, most members are former Liberal Party advisers. One, Amanda Vanstone, was a Howard-era minister; another, Peter Boxall, was the adviser and then department head who designed the ill-fated overhaul of industrial relations, WorkChoices.

All these signs suggest the commission's report will serve primarily a political purpose. It will recommend the "tough love" it says is needed to restore a structural budget surplus. The path it plots will extend far beyond the mandate Tony Abbott sought during the election campaign. The benefit of having a commission of audit deliver these uncomfortable messages is that the Prime Minister can use its ostensibly independent advice to build a case for radical actions: the kind of extreme reforms that some Coalition supporters desire but are difficult to sell politically.

New governments, especially those with a large majority, can be tempted to appease their ideological supporters once they win office. Indeed, pressure is building on Mr Abbott to do so. Business lobbyists are demanding industrial relations changes despite Mr Abbott's promise to leave such laws largely untouched. Pro-market groups such as the Centre for Independent Studies and the Institute of Public Affairs are spruiking their wish-lists, such as abolishing a range of government regulators and cutting welfare spending steeply.

Perhaps the most important lesson for Mr Abbott in dealing with such advice is to reflect on what happened 17 years ago, when the new prime minister, John Howard, appointed his own commission of audit. It proposed an extreme agenda. Among its recommendations were the disposal of the Defence Housing Authority and the Office of National Assessments. It suggested outsourcing the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the federal police's protective services. It urged the Commonwealth to withdraw from tertiary education entirely, other than to fund scholarships. It recommended withdrawing from many other areas of government, too, and handing the responsibilities to the states.

Mr Howard had the political sense to ignore most of his commission's advice. It's no coincidence he went on to become the Coalition's most successful leader since Sir Robert Menzies. The most significant recommendation he agreed to implement - an ''efficiency'' cut of 10 to 15 per cent of public service budgets over three years - ultimately did him little good. It led to about 30,000 redundancies but few structural savings; the government just bought the services those staff provided from elsewhere, such as contractors. Within two terms, the Howard government was as big as ever.

Mr Abbott has given his commission of audit terms of reference that mirror almost exactly those that Mr Howard set 17 years earlier. It's likely the report he receives in January will include very similar recommendations, too.

There is no reason to believe that Mr Abbott is a small-government ideologue. Nor is he a zealous advocate of states' rights; after all, he was the federal health minister who advocated a federal takeover of Tasmania's Mersey Hospital in 2007. Yet he would be wise to reflect carefully on the lessons of 1996: his responses to the extremists in his ear may well decide the success of his prime ministership.