First, as promised during the referendum campaign (as part of an all-party effort from Westminster to keep Scots in), more powers will be quickly devolved on the Scottish Assembly, including power over taxation and welfare. As some wags described it, Scotland was promised virtual independence if they voted against independence.

But just as significantly, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced that any powers given to Scots for the Scots would be granted to an English Assembly, as well as to the existing assemblies in Wales and Ireland. The English will no longer have any vote over substantial matters of Scottish - or Northern Irish or Welsh - law; nor will citizens of any of the other mini-kingdoms have any right to a say over much of English law and government.

Such a revolution in power cannot but create an entirely new constitutional settlement, most of which has not yet even been thought out. Strictly, this is not what the Scots were voting for or against -voters in England, Wales and Northern Ireland were not even being consulted.

The new settlement would turn Britain into a federation, on the pattern of Australia, Canada, Nigeria, India and many other former British colonies. It's also the same pattern as the colony which successfully revolted against British government: the United States. There would be central powers, respecting the single international "nation", the UK or Great Britain, and these would presumably still be determined in Westminister, in a national parliament of all British citizens.

But just as Australia is composed of states and territories, the mini-nations of the UK, and perhaps new ones such as Cornwall or Yorkshire, will have a second tier of government dealing with matters of local importance. No one can say yet just what powers would be at the centre in Westminster and what would be devolved to the "states".

That's in part because no one seems to have thought about it much, except within the context of buying off the Scots without much reflection on wider implications. Even the Scottish referendum owed more to emotions about "freedom" and beliefs than facts about how Scotland won or lost from being inside the UK. The rallying cry was "freedom" and independence - but from what, and with what, and how, was never entirely clear.

At first blush, the existing assemblies, in Cardiff and Stormont as much as Edinburgh, will be wanting maximum devolution. But once it is recognised that any devolution applies equally to England, which is 83 per cent of the new federation, the outliers might suddenly realise that a stripped central government might not have the money or power to help them top up shortfalls in their budgets. In typical federations, there are both centripetal forces - drawing powers and duties in towards the centre - and centrifugal ones - tending to push them out for action by the states.

With such overwhelming size in the federation, the English might well think they can dominate the federation much more easily by keeping the centre weak rather than strong.

Likewise, political parties which are stronger in particular areas may make their calculations not by a view to the national interest but by the solutions which gives them the greater practical power. Britain's conservatives, for example, derive most of their following from England. Friends and allies of the British, including Australians, may well see a period in which Britain is not currently focused on being "great" but on getting its house in order.

The referendum has consumed much British public and media oxygen, and no sooner do the exhausted pick themselves up than Britain is in its own national election campaign - probably for a poll in about nine months.

The very distractions of this campaign, as well as indulgence in temptations to make sectional promises rather than ones created by a sense of national interest, creates a serious risk of an ultimate political and constitutional settlement that suits neither the nation nor any of its constituent parts.