Other than that, of course, it should be very powerful and have a wide remit, if only to confirm that only the pure of heart are involved in divvying up and privatising the public goodies of the ACT.

The Australian Federal Police does not think its ACT element should be subject to the commission – which would make it the only Australian police force not subject to such a body. It is, after all, a Commonwealth agency, only leasing services to the ACT. And its own secret accountability mechanisms at Commonwealth level ought to be enough, it thinks.

Alert for a dollar, however, the AFP thinks that its weak point – the calibre, lack of experience and general passivity of its detective force – should be deployed, at an extra rent, of course, in any commission that is established. This is just so as to make sure it works properly. One would not want a situation, such as, for example, with the Wheat for Oil scandal, where corrupt people got away because police institutionally lacked the will to hunt them down.

Unions ACT wants a very tough and effective commission of wide remit, so long as it goes after wicked capitalists who are ripping off honest unionised workers, and leaves the toilers themselves alone. On the other hand it is terribly worried for the reputations of good folk who might be traduced by such a commission:

"The experience in NSW and other jurisdictions is that the ability for [sic] a commission to make public findings can have serious adverse consequences for individuals," it said, no doubt thinking of the reputations of Eddie Obeid, Ian Macdonald, and his CMFEU mate to whom Macdonald gave a coal lease. Or Arthur Sinodinos and any number of Liberal Party bagmen who were mocked for their poor memories by the NSW ICAC. Or perhaps it was thinking of the crucifixion of former West Australian premier Brian Burke by the WA corruption commission.

Being exposed in public hearings "can amount to a penalty, even if a court later finds that the individual committed no wrong-doing. Unions ACT therefore does not support an ACT Integrity Commission to have [sic] powers to make public findings". It also thinks that the commission should not be able to conduct inquiries of its own motion, but should depend on referrals from sound agencies, perhaps ACT Labor ministers.

This is of a one with the view of the union representing ACT public servants which insists that it takes "corruption and misconduct very seriously and supports efforts to prevent" it, because it "compromises the work of CPSU members who take pride in the work they do." Although it thinks such a commission should be well staffed (presumably by CPSU members), it wants it be under very strict controls so that due process is ensured, to have default private hearings "to ensure fairness", to have no power to make findings, and to have to steer clear of any of the existing integrity frameworks, which apparently work very well indeed.

A good many of the submissions to the ACT Assembly committee appear to believe that just about anyone can walk up to the front counter of an Australian anti-corruption body, and make any number of false and defamatory allegation against anyone, with full privilege, likely to be reported by the media, and used to slam reputations either without any right of reply, or with a reply only long after the damage has been done.

What seems to be wanting are good examples of this happening, ones involving the completely pure at heart losing their reputations. A good many people who have escaped adverse findings have nonetheless been allegedly involved in eyebrow-raising conduct, inviting legitimate scrutiny.

Many do not seem to appreciate that anti-corruption bodies begin investigations privately, conducting formal hearings only when an investigation has reached a point, in a manner somewhat resembling a criminal committal proceeding, where there is a prima facie case of improper conduct, or corruption of a level worthy of the commission's notice.

Generally, the loudest wailing about injustice and prejudice has come from the highly expensive lawyers representing not-so-innocent "victims" of NSW and Western Australian inquiries. Their cases have been taken up with some fervor by some politicians, and some media outlets, with motives of their own.

And, sometimes, reports from anti-corruption inquiries have been able to put enough on the record to make the public aware of some very dodgy goings-on, without afterwards having been able to gather enough admissible evidence to secure convictions.

There can be several reasons for this which do not undermine the public value of having had the inquiry or the publicity. Criminal proceedings involve proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the standard of proof is lower in commission inquiries. And sometimes, unwilling and unco-operative ICAC witnesses are forced to give evidence that cannot be subsequently used against them. That they are walking around free, without having been prosecuted, or that they can sometimes say that ICAC made no unfavourable findings against them does not always mean that their conduct has been beyond criticism.

The ACT Law Society and the ACT Bar Association appear to have been rattled by the idea of dead cats being thrown into the ring by an irresponsible and uncontrollable integrity commissioner. This is, of course, entirely consistent with its view that disciplinary proceedings against legal practitioners , which likewise do not commence until there is a prima facie case to be answered, should be conducted "in club" rather than accountably than in the public eye.

"As a general rule, matters considered by the independent integrity commission should be managed privately, but the IIC should have the power to conduct public hearings in specified circumstances," the Law Society says. "The society notes that a number of jurisdictions prescribe a public interest test to provide guidance as to when it is appropriate to hold public (as opposed to private) hearings. It is important that the IIC have sufficient flexibility to proactively balance the public interest in disclosing and exposing corrupt behaviour with the potential disproportionate damage to reputation (including the public's trust in government bodies)."

The Bar Association says "some jurisdictions hold no public hearings. Others do. It is recognised that the holding of public hearings can 'trash' reputations easily." The association provides no examples, though perhaps it was thinking of Eddie Obeid.

It continues, again without examples that "The holding of public inquiries has in some instances proved controversial, and have, in some cases, become somewhat theatrical in nature." Perhaps it was thinking of the cross-examination of "Chook" Fowler, or of the indifferent memories of some ministers of the crown.

"The Bar favours an approach that assumes that the hearing will take place in private but allows public hearings to be conducted on a public interest-private right discretion. ".

By contrast, the Australia Institute review of the various anti-corruption bodies around the nation found a direct correlation between public hearings and effectiveness.

Where state and territory parliaments have been susceptible to their own fears for their reputations, as well as the worries of the big end of town, the bodies seem to fail to catch much in the way of corruption.

A failure to catch anyone could be, of course, because there isn't very much fraud on the taxpayer, bribery, corruption, nepotism and abuse of office in states such as Victoria, Tasmania, Queensland, South Australia and, soon, the Northern Territory. Or it could be that the commissioners have been designed for failure.

"Design features are critical to the success of an anti-corruption commission in fulfilling its role of investigating and exposing systemic corruption," the left-of-centre institute said. "We have compared the design and effectiveness of the NSW ICAC, the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission, the Victorian Broad-based Commission against Corruption, the South Australian ICAC and the Tasmanian Integrity Commission. Our research finds that a broader definition of corrupt conduct and regular public hearings render NSW ICAC far more effective than other state bodies.

"From 2012-2016, NSW ICAC made corrupt conduct findings against 123 people, referred 76 people to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and held 28 public hearings. This is a significantly better performance than other state commissions.

The Qld CCC held no public hearings and referred 32 people to the DPP, while Victoria's IBAC held four public hearings, made no corrupt conduct findings and referred six people to the DPP. SA ICAC and Tasmania IC held no public hearings, made no corrupt conduct findings and, while SA ICAC referred 16 people to the DPP, the Tas IC made no referrals.

"In addition to higher numbers of hearings and corruption findings, NSW ICAC also pursued investigations in systemic large-scale cases, including ministers issuing corrupt mining licences and major parties taking illegal donations. In contrast the Queensland CCC investigated minor fraud involving one or two individuals, including public servants lying on their timesheets or issuing dodgy driving licences.

"According to former and current state commissioners in NSW and Victoria, many investigations at state level would not have been successful without members of the public coming forward with additional evidence at public hearings.

" Former assistant NSW ICAC Commissioner Anthony Whealy QC has said, 'there are many people out there in the public arena who will have information that's very important to the investigation. If you conduct the investigation behind closed doors, they never hear of it, and the valuable information they have will be lost….'

"Public hearings provide a transparent, timely and accessible form for an ICAC to expose corruption. They allow members of the public to hear for themselves the allegations and the evidence, and see how ICAC investigations function. Despite reservations about public hearings based on 'reputational risk' from some academics, public hearings allow allegations to be heard and judged by all.

"If unfair allegations are indeed made, the public and the media will see that the person in question is being treated unfairly. As the role of anti-corruption commissions is to investigate and expose corruption, and much of the content of investigations comes out in hearings, the act of hiding hearings from public view threatens the proper function of the commission.

"Former ICAC commissioner David Ipp QC has said 'Its main function is exposing corruption; this cannot be done without public hearings.'"

This does not seem to be the view of the federal Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, which thinks that it has done a splendid job entirely behind closed doors. Its remit is over bodies with some law enforcement function, and it does not want for public resources. What it wants for, however, is results known to the public, or subject to any external scrutiny from anyone likely to scoff at the meagre array of rats-and-mice prosecutions – about two a year -- it has produced.

If it is as truly effective as its known results would suggest, federal law enforcement bodies – alone of cop-like bodies anywhere else in Australia, and unlike the FBI and British police services,-- are almost entirely free of problems of corruption or abuse of power. So too, apparently, is the paramilitary Border Forces, though it has only relatively recently been taking the miraculous CLEI medicine, whatever it is.

Scoring well, at least from CLEI, on integrity does not always reflect in AFP transparency. I have an FOI request in with the AFP about its thinking on ACT corruption. On Thursday morning, the AFP FOI officer told me I had failed to satisfy her that disclosure of such information would be in the public interest. This was a decision she reversed in the afternoon, which may mean, nearly two weeks after the moment when the request could be regarded as having been refused for want of being within time, the AFP might get around to finding the documents and considering whether they can be disclosed.

Each branch of government has advisers, standards setters, codes of conduct, and committees, each of which thinks it is doing a fabulous job. It's a complete industry, though whether it achieves much, or deters much corruption, misbehaviour, or incompetence is open to question. No one is more pleased with themselves or more complacent than those supervising the ACT public service itself - a state of affairs mirrored by the self-satisfaction of the federal public service commission in its submissions to the senate about a federal integrity commissioner.

A reading of the submissions to the ACT Assembly inquiry serves as a useful reminder of how many existing folk and bodies are already in the ACT integrity pie. But it does not serve to show how the sum of them meets all of the need, or even whether they are doing a good job. It is interesting to consider that none, other than the Auditor-General, seemed to have any "independent" interest when strong criticism was being made of ACT land planning decisions last year.

The ACT Auditor-General, one of the few ACT watchdogs to have barked over some (but by no means all) of the strange land dealings is oddly circumspect in her submission. One senses of many of the other internal or "independent" watchdogs that they would prefer the quiet life, gnawing on safe and predictable misfeasance such as misuse of travel allowances, making personal phone calls in office times, and being rude to customers.

Heaven forfend that the anti-corruption artillery ever be trained on ministers, or magistrates, members of government boards, secretaries of political parties, or functionaries of entities related to political parties, such as licensed clubs.

Jack Waterford is a former Canberra Times editor. jwaterfordcanberra@gmail.com