For the first time ever in modern Egyptian history, and arguably its ancient one, Egyptians have chosen their leader. The election of the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi as the president of Egypt is of major historical significance. In a very divisive election, Morsi beat Ahmad Shafik with a narrow margin of approximately 51 per cent to Shafik's 49 per cent. His presidency will not be an easy one, as he attempts to deal with a stagnant economy and a powerful military establishment that is not willing to cede power easily. During the Egyptian uprising on January 25, 2011 the leading chant was, ''E'eish , horriya , a'adala'h Ijtima'iya!'' (Bread, freedom, social justice!). This simple yet ingenious chant clearly stated in a few simple words the revolution's economic, political and social demands. Eighteen months later, it is clear that none of these demands have been fully met. It will be up to President Morsi to attempt to solve these issues, and attempt to realise the aspirations of millions of Egyptians.
While the uprising has empowered Egyptians politically, it's undeniable that economically it has had a devastating effect. In its immediate aftermath, the Egyptian economy shrunk recording negative growth, of which it has partially recovered. Foreign reserves have more than halved to $US15.6 billion ($A15.25 billion) , and tourism, a lifeline of the economy, has dropped 32 per cent.The official unemployment rate is a staggering 12.4 per cent, meaning the unofficial one is much higher.
The current economic conditions cannot be blamed solely on the uprising, rather on the structure of the Egyptian economy itself under Mubarak, as well as the legacy of previous presidents. It is clear that if a Morsi administration is to achieve an economic breakthrough, some painful decisions have to be made, risking a breakdown. The issue of subsidies is high on the agenda; they eat up an average of 8 per cent of GDP and absorb 28 per cent of government expenditures, two-thirds of it on fuel and energy, the rest are mainly food subsidies, predominantly wheat. It is no coincidence that eei'sh (bread) was the first demand of the revolution; it is the daily staple of millions of Egyptians,. That is why Egypt is the largest per capita wheat consumer and its largest importer in the world. While food subsidies will be very tricky to touch for any political leadership, fuel subsidies will have to be partially eliminated in order for the economy to survive in the long term.
Externally, Arab and international Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) will have to resume to achieve future growth in the ailing economy. In order for FDI to return to Egypt fully, investors will be looking for a stable political environment, amiable business-labour relations, and the State's adherence to contractual obligations. Unfortunately, confidence in all three has been deeply shaken since January 25 and will take time to return. Should many of these economic conditions not be dealt with, the Egyptian economy in the short term will risk further social upheaval that Morsi will have to deal with.
Economic reform should go hand in hand with political reform. The 2011 parliamentary election has seen the rise of the Islamists, personified by the MB and the Salafists. The first round of the 2012 presidential elections cemented the view that there are two major powers at play: the army and the Islamists. Under a Morsi administration, the transition period has to see a development of the political values of Egyptians, who after years of apathy, are now forced to think about what kind of state they would like to live in.
With continued political reform, the coming years will have to bring a new social contract that organises the relationship between the state and the individual in a way that has never been done before in any Arab country, which for years its citizens lived under the heavy arm of the state. Such a new social contract under a new republic will be considered as a breakthrough locally and regionally. ANU Professor and previous Australian ambassador to Egypt Robert Bowker argues that for political reform to occur there ''needs to be competitive, inclusive, secular political movements, capable of contesting effectively the Islamists' claim to have a monopoly on social justice in all its forms.''
Social justice is another one of the demands of the revolution that remains unfulfilled. To this day, the disparity in wealth continues to increase. Even though the Mubarak regime attempted to reform the economy starting from the 1990's, nonetheless this was at the expense of the lowest echelons of society. Toby Dodge from the London School of Economics writes that across the countries of the Arab revolutions, ''Neoliberal reforms produced a politically connected but small nouveau riche, with the majority of the population excluded and increasingly resentful. The transitional governments need to reformulate economic policies in a way that delivers meaningful growth to this previously alienated majority.''
Since the revolution of 2011 the conditions have not improved. There are demands that are yet to be fulfilled, chiefly among them, raising the minimum wage and universal health cover. Also, clean water, education and sanitation are issues that occupy the minds of the average Egyptian. Social justice issues will be high on the agenda of Morsi and are closely related to the economy - government subsidies must be redirected to the segments of the population that need them most. If some of these social justice demands are not met, again this could mean further unrest in the coming years under a Muslim Brotherhood leadership of Egypt.
The uprising is a rare opportunity for Egyptians to shape what kind of Egypt they would like to live in. However, this opportunity carries immense risk with local, regional and international forces not in favour of change.
The one clear gain of the uprising is that Egyptians for the first time in several millennia are no longer afraid to challenge their leaders. Governing Egypt will not be an easy task for Morsi, as he navigates the multitude of demands and needs.
Adel Abdel Ghafar is a PhD Scholar at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University