Because Air Marshal Angus Houston is still the Chief of the Defence Force, last week's clean sweep of the heads of the individual services has been portrayed as "steady as she goes". The reality is very different.
The move represents a radical transformation and clearly shows that this Government is determined to get exactly what it wants from the forces. This fundamental shake-up of the high command is a first step towards signalling that things have changed on Russell Hill. These new chiefs have been chosen as agents of change and everyone is on notice that things are going to be done in a new way. The old order is out.
There is no need to look any further than the background of the new chiefs themselves to see what an assault this represents to the traditional way of doing business. None of the three new commanders is a typical product of the officer training establishments.
Navy Chief Rear Admiral Russell Crane began as a junior seaman; Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie started as an apprentice in the army; and Air Vice Marshal Mark Binskin actually began his flying career in the navy. He is perhaps the biggest surprise appointment. Only 48 years old, he is the person who has most obviously leapt ahead of other capable officers to command the air force.
Individually, none of the choices is surprising because all three commanders are more than capable of doing the job.
For the past decade the three services have stopped putting the word "the" in front of army, navy or air force. It was a literary trick, making it seem as if the institutions had some sort of personality that was greater than their individual components or the people wearing the uniform. Perhaps unintentionally, this made it appear as if there was only one way of doing things and that while the organisational structure could be fiddled with, it could never be changed significantly.
The implication was that the military had its own way of doing things, and while it provided a service to government, it did so in its own way. The responsibility of the politicians was simply to fund the forces. This Government is demonstrating, quite decisively, that the services will no longer be able to get away with pretending that things can only be done in a particular way.
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced the new appointments himself. In part this was a demonstration of his normal tendency to micro-manage, yet it also displayed something else. It signalled clearly that this move to significantly change the services is coming from the top; and that the prime minister will back Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon to the hilt as he wrestles with the organisation, trying to get it to perform the way the Government wants.
Nevertheless, this is not a direct assault; it is rather an attempt to reform the organisation from within. People have been inserted into the top jobs who are prepared to think more broadly about how missions can be achieved and, more particularly, are prepared to accept that there is more than one way to skin a cat.
The best example of the crisis that besets the defence structure can be found within the navy. The submarine service is a vital element of this capability. Air warfare destroyers and the surface fleet are absolutely necessary to project power, but the last line of defence of the continent is found beneath the water. As long as the submarine force remains intact, no enemy could ever hope to gain lodgment on Australia's shore.
The previous government focused on the surface fleet, buying equipment and ignoring the increasingly hollow shells of the submarines. Currently, more than 40per cent of the seagoing berths are unfilled. This increases the strain on the remaining submariners. The previous government tried recruiting from overseas and throwing money at the problem but nothing has worked. As a result, only half of the units can be put to sea, and an essential naval capacity is effectively absent from the order of battle.
Fixing this is the job of the Chief of Navy. Under the model that, until now, the Defence Force has enthusiastically embraced, the government determines what particular capability it requires (for example, Output 2.4 capability for submarine operations).
The services then continue doing what they have always done; while also producing a glossy annual report (stating the outcome has been "substantially achieved") to keep the politicians quiet. The reality is then buried deep within the report in small print and weasel words, such as submarine "mission capability was not fully achieved due to systems-related defects and workforce shortfalls". Then, when one of the boats does manage to be put to sea, photographers are quickly deployed to prove that everything is OK, regardless of the reality.
The changes at the top send a clear signal that the politicians will no longer tolerate this state of affairs.
This was reinforced by Fitzgibbon's firm language in linking these appointments to the current "people and skills shortage".
The minister made the point that "every three months or more if required, the service chiefs will still [report] progress they have made in meeting the exacting requirements of their services for skilled trades and professions". He expects to see progress. What makes this frightening from the point of view of the new chiefs is that failure will not be tolerated.
The Government has thrown down the challenge to the forces. There is not an ever-expanding balance sheet that will fund the continuing natural desire of the military to do things its way. The purse strings have now drawn tight. There is not enough money to continue doing things in the old way.
The Government has three service chiefs who it hopes will reform the institution from within. That's what they will be backed to do force through change. If they aren't able or prepared to do this, the Government will find someone who will.
Nicholas Stuart is a Canberra writer.
nic.stuart@hotmail.com
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