T
here are times when I think
myself the only person left
alive, in the ACT anyway (at
least since Bill Mason died),
who is a fan of the American
economist Henry George. But
whenever I so proclaim myself,
people, including Treasury
economists, shyly come forward to
admit that there is something in him.
This week, for the first time in nearly
40 years, even closet Georgists could
manage a slight grin, the better for
living in the ACT which is still, in
some respects, built on his
principles.
Jon Stanhope offered young home-
buyers an interim and indefinite
saving of perhaps $200 a week on
getting into the Canberra home
market. It is not a subsidy, nor ought
it distort housing markets, and is far
more economically sound than first
home-buyers grants or stamp duty
subsidies, which distort markets in a
way particularly paid for by first
home buyers.
Henry George was a 19th century
American journalist and populist
economist whose books, at one time,
were outsold only by the Bible. He
had a deep influence on early
federation Australian politics and it is
thanks to his disciples that Canberra
has a leasehold system.
George's primary insight came
from recognising that an acre or
hectare in the wilderness 1000km
from anywhere might be worth at
most 50c. But the same hectare, 1km
from a major city centre, might be
worth $50million. What caused the
difference?
The hectare near the CBD was
located beside roads, sewerage
works, power lines, schools and
hospitals and other community
facilities. Demand, and price, was a
function of all of those works (paid
for by the community generally) and
by the eagerness of other citizens to
live in, and invest in, places where
markets, work and facilities were
gathered together.
George thought the development
of such facilities, which so added to
the value of land, should be paid for
by taxing the increase of the value of
land. The community, not the owner,
had created this added value at
least to the raw land (the unimproved
capital value).
There is a slight smattering of Marx
and not a little socialism in some
Georgist ideas, but they appealed
even to economic conservatives. At
federation, after all, income tax
scarcely existed. Sales and excise
duties were deeply uncertain in their
effect. Many other taxes, particularly
transfer taxes, were obviously
counterproductive, and ways of
paying for the operation of a
government were at a premium.
Land taxes (or rents) had the especial
attraction of being efficient to collect,
impossible to avoid (regardless of
ownership structures) and
progressive in nature, so that the rich
paid more.
Australian Georgists at the turn of
last century thought that the best way
of putting such ideas into effect was
with leasehold schemes. A lease, after
all, implied rent, and rent could be
set as a proportion of value say
5per cent. One could, for example,
lease out all land on 99-year leases,
on the basis that landholders paid as
an annual rent 5 per cent of its value
from time to time. Just as the UCV of
Canberra land is revalued every few
years for rates (which amount to
somewhat less than 1 per cent of land
value), such a scheme could
''capture'' rising land prices and
convert at least some of it for the
benefit of the community.
The advocates for, and the first
developers of Canberra, decided the
national capital would be the test bed
for Georgist theories. They believed
the entire cost of developing the
capital (including building public
service offices, parliaments and so
on) could be paid for by using a land
rent scheme, even if it took time for
the city to grow to the point where
rents exceeded outgoings. Even
before that happened, the whole
scheme was a profit-in-being,
because a time would come when the
outgoings were small compared with
the rents coming in.
In its purest form, a person coming
to Canberra would espy a nice vacant
block of land, albeit one with sewage,
electricity and kerbing, and decide it
would be a fabulous place on which
to build a house and live. Because it
was nearer a school and the shops, its
''price'' might be 100 compared
with another one, a kilometre away,
costing only 50.
But one did not pay 100 for this
chosen block. One paid 5 (5 per
cent) and agreed that for each year of
the next 99 one would pay 5 per cent
of its assessed value. One's income
could be focused on borrowing for
building, not the land. One could
start building immediately (indeed,
one had to within six months) but the
banks recognised one's security of
title and had no compunction about
lending. The guy who bought the 50
block was, of course, paying only
2/10/- a year.
If one bought and built, but later
decided to sell and move closer in,
one could ''sell'' the unexpired part
of the lease to another. The ''buyer''
had to continue making lease
payments, but, in the nature of things
(including the fact that 99 years
amortised is hardly anything less
than freehold), the ''value'' of the
land sold came close to an ordinary
freehold value. A newcomer could
buy an established home at prices
comparable to, say, Adelaide, or take
a vacant block (at a massive
immediate discount) and build.
Canberra grew much more slowly
than originally planned, and those
implementing the scheme were
much more mechanical and silly
about its administration than they
should have been. But the scheme
worked, more or less, to 1970. At that
stage, the local Member, Jim Fraser,
who had held the ACT seat forever on
freehold, as it were, died, and the
Liberal government of the day
thought it could be wrested from
Labor. It offered Canberra
landowners a massive bribe: vote for
us and we will waive your duty to
make future leasehold payments.
It was popular with old-timers but
didn't succeed in wresting the seat
from Labor. But the scheme changed.
And, henceforth, ACT landbuyers no
longer paid a 5 per cent annual land
rent, but a sum, usually set at
auction, thought to encompass the
whole 99-year lease price in one hit.
Instead of putting down, say, $2000
on a $40,000 block at Farrer, one had
to pay the $40,000 upfront, and
incorporate that cost in the mortgage
one took to build the house as well.
The Stanhope scheme is a partial
reversion to pre-1970 times. Not a
full one. The 2 per cent rent is, in
effect, an option to purchase, albeit
one that can be deferred for years,
until one can afford to pay.
Ultimately, if needs be when one
finally sells, the full lease price has to
be paid in one hit. But a young family
can defer that debt until they can
afford to pay say for 15 years, by
when family income is higher and the
kids are not such a burden. It could
be extended further, even without
means tests, without amounting to
any sort of public subsidy. It
probably should be.
Jack Waterford is editor-at-large.