Since 1991, meetings between American and Russian leaders have become routine and often inconsequential affairs. While they may have lacked substance, many of these meetings turned out to be memorable on a personal level and because of their sheer espieglerie.

Who could forget Boris Yeltsin's drunken antics when sojourning with good friend Bill Clinton, for example, or George W. Bush's remark about looking into Vladimir Putin's eyes and detecting a soul. In the lead-up to Barack Obama's visit to Moscow from today until Wednesday, there are signs that personal chemistry will also feature prominently in the encounter between him and Dmitry Medvedev.

The Kremlin press office has let it slip that the two presidents are cordially disposed to each other and even use the informal Russian second-person pronoun ''ty'' in interpreted conversations.

The question remains whether the budding comradeship between Obama and Medvedev will be translated into an improvement of bilateral ties, or will remain utterly irrelevant as was the case in the preceding two decades.

Obama comes to Moscow at a time when the distrust between the two countries is at a historical high point, approaching Cold War-era levels. A Russian sociological survey revealed last week that about 65 per cent of Russians consider the United States an unfriendly state, compared with 18 per cent who view it as a friend.

The Russian position regarding relations with the US has remained more or less constant and transparent since 2000 under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. Its latest recapitulation came in May 2009 in the National Security Strategy 2020 document signed by Medvedev, which suggested that Russia will strive towards building an equal and fully fledged strategic partnership with the US on the basis of coinciding interests. The attainment of new agreements in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and arms control, confidence building measures, the resolution of issues pertaining to WMD proliferation, the strengthening of anti-terrorist cooperation, and the settlement of regional conflicts will remain priorities.

By contrast, successive US administrations have treated Russia in an ad hoc way. At best, it was ignored. At worst, it was harangued, lectured, forced into adopting unilateral concessions, presented with faits accomplis, and in general contained, just like during the Cold War.

One of the central issues Obama will have to deal with in Moscow is the impending expiration of the landmark Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). The treaty's replacement, START II, was derailed by America's unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and its plans to deploy elements of a new generation of global missile defence close to Russia's borders.

Russia's objections, and alternative proposals based on joint response to threats emanating from rogue states such as Iran, fell on deaf ears. Thus far the Obama Administration has proved to be as intransigent as its predecessor on showing goodwill and assuaging Russia's fears. The same goes for the US reluctance to curb the conventional arms build-up in Europe and NATO's expansion eastwards.

In the early days of the Obama presidency, pressure was brought on the White House to radically amend its approach to Russia. For instance, a representative bipartisan Commission on US Policy toward Russia co-chaired by former US senators Chuck Hagel and Gary Hart published a report in March 2009 arguing that partnership with Russia is indispensible to defending American national interests such as combating terrorism, pacifying Afghanistan, upholding the non-proliferation regime and ensuring energy security.

It enjoined US decision-makers to focus on these imperatives, take a new look at missile-defence deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic and accept that neither Ukraine nor Georgia is ready for NATO membership, pursuing instead other options to demonstrate a commitment to their sovereignty. Most significantly, the report suggested respecting Russia's sovereignty, history and traditions, and recognising that Russian society will evolve at its own pace instead of continuing with a mentoring and condescending tone.

The Hagel-Hart report, which may have served as a blueprint for a radical overhaul of America's Russian policy on the lines of pragmatism, genuine cooperation and sensible quid pro quo came under attack from the entrenched and polyphonic Russophobe lobby in Washington, DC.

The neocons labelled it a collection of meaningless platitudes encouraging imperialist instincts of Russia.

The liberal triumphalists insisted on the continued effort to propagate the universal Jeffersonian values of democracy.

In March this year, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, pressed a symbolic reset button at a meeting in Geneva, yet this has remained an empty gesture.

The hardliners seem to have carried the day.

A clear illustration of who has Obama's ear came last week, when Obama publicly juxtaposed Medvedev and Putin as representing two different strands in Russian foreign policy, accusing the latter of harbouring a Cold War mentality.

In doing so, Obama reproduced almost verbatim the favourite thesis of the neocon doyen Richard Perle, blaming the disruption in relations on the former KGB officer with an incurable nostalgia for the Soviet empire.

This clumsy attempt to split what the Russians call tandemocracy, coupled with the reluctance to analyse the behaviour of Russian leaders as rational actors informed by legitimate security concerns, does not augur well for the reset mission.

It has also transpired that Obama will attempt to create another ''Cairo moment'' in Moscow, bringing the message of freedom and democracy directly to the Russian people. His senior political adviser, Michael McFaul, a Russia specialist and long-time fan of Boris Yeltsin, seems to have planned this part of the visit.

The delusion that ordinary Russians crave the return of Yeltsin's golden age of liberalism and are ready to embrace American political values (sinister Putin's propaganda notwithstanding) has successfully migrated to the new administration.

In summary, it is becoming progressively difficult to expect that Obama's 212 days in Moscow will accomplish more than PR froth and tactical agreements on a handful of secondary issues.

In the absence of a cardinal re-evaluation of Russia, its political trajectory and its role as a partner in global affairs by the Obama Administration, a lasting improvement in bilateral relations is not going to happen.

Dr Nourzhanov is a senior lecturer at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (The Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.