If President Pervez Musharraf expected Pakistan's parliamentary elections to bring some political relief to him and to restore the United States' confidence in him, he has certainly misread the situation.
The triumph of the opposition parties has now put him in a more precarious position than ever before. It also confronts the US with serious dilemmas.
The elections were held against the backdrop of growing crisis of political legitimacy, violence and instability in Pakistan. Mr Musharraf's military dictatorship and his alliance with the US as the White House's critical partner in the so-called war on terror lay at the heart of Pakistan's woes.
Both Mr Musharraf and the Bush Administration were hopeful that the elections would take some of the heat out of the popular anger against Mr Musharraf and the US, given that seven out of 10 Pakistanis had wanted the demise of Mr Musharraf and a restructuring of Pakistan's relations with the US.
However, the election results may not deliver the degree of stability and security for which Pakistan and the region are crying. This is because Mr Musharraf is unwilling to give up power that easily, and the US does not want to see the fall of the Pakistani leader that quickly.
Mr Musharraf has already secured himself another term as president from the old parliament, which he had packed with his own supporters, and the Supreme Court, which was appointed under state of emergency last November. He has declared that he will remain in his position and work with whichever party or parties are in control of the parliament and cabinet.
Meanwhile, despite its public support for Pakistan's transformation into a democracy, the Bush Administration would be extremely hesitant to back any government formed by the opposition parties that would not be committed to America's stand against Muslim extremism and a willing ally in its war on terror.
While the former popular leader of Pakistan People's Party Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in December, had made a personal commitment to the US in this respect, many in her party may no longer remain loyal to that commitment.
Meanwhile, the other main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who has always ruled out any accommodation with Mr Musharraf, has been highly critical of America's support for Mr Musharraf and its quest for wider influence in Pakistan and the region.
It is these two parties that have now won the largest number of seats and have entered a coalition to form a government of national consensus.
Mr Sharif himself was barred from running for election on charges of corruption, but he will continue to exert a determining influence in the coalition government through his party's critical participation. If the Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League want to retain the support of a majority of the Pakistani people, they will have little choice but to rationalise Pakistan's relations with the US and Pakistan's participation in the war on terror. As such, America's push for democracy may come back to haunt it, but it cannot have it both ways.
Mr Musharraf is now set to use some of the faultlines between the two opposition parties, as well as his firm control of the military and its notorious intelligence agency as the backbone of his rule to achieve three objectives. One is to prevent minor opposition parties from joining a possible coalition so that it would not be able to secure a two-thirds majority required under the constitution to impeach him.
Another is to discredit the Muslim League by highlighting its Islamic credentials and thereby implying not only that the party has natural sympathy with Muslim extremists, but also that the People's Party has contaminated itself by entering a coalition with it.
The third is to heighten his military campaign against Muslim militants in order to demonstrate that he is the only leader capable of confronting them strongly.
By the same logic, such a development could lock in US support for Mr Musharraf.
The Bush Administration fully recognises that Mr Musharraf is still in control of the instrumentalities of state power, especially the military and the intelligence agency.
It understands that these instrumentalities are also the tools on which the US must rely in its regional strategy to keep an eye on Pakistan's nuclear weapons and to defeat al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies in neighbouring Afghanistan, where they have increasingly become a major challenge to the US and its NATO and non-NATO allies. Whatever transpires in Pakistan can have a massive bearing on the US-led efforts to stabilise Afghanistan.
As the situation stands, the results of the parliamentary elections were relatively freer than feared, but they are unlikely to bring much political relief and stability either to Pakistanis or to the wider region any time soon. Pakistan's ills are very deep seated.
The country has a long way to go before it could overcome them and claim that it is on a solid path to democratisation.
It is likely to remain a bastion of violence, volatility and extremism, as it has been for most of the 61 years of its existence unless, that is, the US and Mr Musharraf are willing to put Pakistan's interests before theirs. At this stage, neither seem willing to change course.
Amin Saikal is Professor of Political Science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (The Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.