The sentencing of Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi on Monday to a further 18 months' house arrest has undermined whatever little hope remained internationally that the military would allow meaningful democratic change after the elections next year, prompting renewed calls for sanctions to punish the regime.
The Australian Government, and the international community more generally, however, must resist any temptation to further withdraw from Burma at this time. Despite their obvious shortcomings, the multi-party elections scheduled for 2010 and the inauguration of a new constitution will effect the most important political changes in the country in 20 years. This is a time to engage, not to further isolate and thus deny ourselves any influence over critical developments there.
Dismay over the non-democratic nature of the military's so-called ''roadmap to democracy'' should not blind us to the opportunities that this process nonetheless entails. The double transition to a new generation of military leaders and a new set of institutions is a chance for democrats both inside and outside the country to at least get a foot in the door. The new leaders will be looking to show that things have changed for the better and for the first time since 1962 opposition parties will have a legal right to participate in governance.
The impact of the upcoming changes is already felt inside Burma. While Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy is now almost certain to boycott the elections, a number of other independent parties are actively preparing to participate. The level of political discussion in the country has increased noticeably in recent months. Moreover, the Government is allowing some space for new political activities, including leadership training and grassroots consultations, which are important for building democratic values and institutions in the longer term.
These changes, coupled with the revitalisation of local civil society since the devastating cyclone that hit Burma in May last year, are among the most hopeful developments in the country in a long time and deserve our attention and support. Indeed, they are signs, however limited, of nascent liberalisation by a regime that traditionally has claimed total control over nearly all aspects of public life.
The West's long-standing push for regime change is a losing strategy for the simple reason that it directly confronts a regime over which we have no significant leverage. The military remains absolutely opposed to democracy, which senior leaders believe would undermine national security, not to mention their personal and institutional interests. It has, however, shown some willingness over the past two decades to relax its draconian controls over society in order to promote peace and economic growth.
The new government is likely to take further steps in that direction, if for no other reason then to try to legitimise the new order. Rather than try to impose solutions from afar, the international community should work to reinforce and deepen such changes underway inside Burma.
This approach will inevitably be seen as appeasement by those who insist on immediate regime change. But dictatorships do not disappear overnight, at least not in countries that have no living experience with democracy. Change is likely to come about only gradually through an opening of space for independent organisations and the emergence of a more confident and rights-aware citizenry.
If our commitment to help the Burmese people is to mean anything, we cannot persist with symbolic policies that do little but assuage our own conscience. We need to act based on what is possible, not on some idealistic notion of what the world should be like.
Many have argued that neither sanctions nor engagement work in Burma (prompting searches for some third way, which usually puts the onus for changing the country on China another losing strategy). This is self-evidently true for sanctions, which have failed entirely in their primary purpose of forcing the regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi and enter into dialogue with the democratic and ethnic opposition. But such arguments are selling engagement short.
Despite numerous constraints on access and funding, international organisations on the ground have made limited, but significant, progress in recent years towards breaking Burma's long-standing isolation, improving social policies and empowering civil society.
In addition to saving tens of thousands of lives every year, international engagement is thus slowly, slowly helping to change the way the Government thinks and interacts with its own citizens, as well as how many Burmese see themselves.
With further openings likely to emerge from the ongoing transition, it is time to craft a policy that more fully uses the few levers that have actually been shown to work.
None of this is to say, that we should refrain from speaking out about the pervasive human rights abuses in Burma or the shortcomings of the ongoing transition process. Quite the contrary.
Any serious strategy of engagement must put rights front and centre at all levels of dialogue and cooperation.
But normative pressure can be exercised without mindlessly ratcheting up sanctions, which have little practical impact other than limiting our ability to influence broader social, political and economic processes. Quiet, but persistent, pressure and support for incremental gains is likely over time to shape the political behaviour of the military more effectively than public condemnation and sanctions ever could.
Such an instrumental approach may not be as emotionally satisfying or politically attractive, but it is likely to do more good.
Morten Pedersen is a research fellow at the Centre for International Governance and Justice, RegNet, Australian National University.
He previously worked as senior analyst for the International Crisis Group in Burma and is the author of Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
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