Many observers would ask why the world should care about Burma, notwithstanding the widespread sense of moral outrage prompted by the military regime's brutal suppression of dissent recently. We care because the humanitarian, political and economic costs of any prolongation of Burma's 19-year political impasse are so high. To a large extent, any solution must come from the Burmese people themselves. The recent protests clearly show that the people are determined to assert a different view from that of their current military rulers.
International and United Nations action on Burma has failed in the past because the international community was not united on Burma. But this has changed somewhat, with China now more prepared to accept a limited UN role. So how does the international community orchestrate its response now, taking due account of the views of the people of Burma?
One legal problem in dealing with Burma is that the military government is recognised as the legal government. Even though it lacks political legitimacy, the world is obliged to respect its position as the Government for the moment. This is why a formal mandate to undertake any international mission in Burma is necessary. Such a mandate can only come properly from the UN. Without such formal standing, no international strategy will be accepted and treated seriously by the military, which for the time being remains firmly in control.
The international community needs to approach the Burma problem analytically, not emotionally. We need to make careful calculations about strategies and tactics, learning from past mistakes (of which there have been many, on all sides), and choosing options with the highest chances of success. Given the depth of the political impasse and absence of processes inside Burma for negotiation, mediation or reconciliation, the UN might usefully employ some of the techniques of conflict resolution. Some of these were tried by a previous UN special envoy in 2002-03, with partial success.
One policy problem in dealing with Burma internationally is that it does not fit the standard pattern for international intervention. Neither full sanctions, nor military invasion, nor massive assistance are available or suitable as options. On most of these, despite what many supporters think, Burma simply does not reach the normal threshold for international intervention. Nor is this "state building" as such, so the options and scope for action are not clear.
Yet the international community needs to be more creative and more ambitious about what it should do and how it should go about this. But nobody should underestimate the difficulties of dealing with the military regime, while it remains stubbornly in power.
It is important that the UN enlists the assistance of other parts of the UN system with relevant expertise (such as special rapporteur on human rights Professor Paulo Pinheiro, who was recently in Burma) if it is to achieve results. UN member countries must also actively lend their support. The leading role in the UN is not best carried out by the United States or Britain, who are not sufficiently detached to have credibility with Asian countries.
Nor will the Association of South-East Asian Nations intervene directly, given that Burma is a member of ASEAN. But ASEAN can helpfully reinforce the UN's role through high-level visits and other interaction. Some more direct Chinese support for a UN-sponsored reconciliation process could also be valuable, but China's influence on the military regime, and China's interests in Burma, should not be exaggerated.
We need to allow the unfolding strategy of UN special envoy Professor Ibrahim Gambari to work through, while being realistic about what the UN and Gambari can achieve. This means maintaining present sanctions, but not imposing new ones for the moment. It would be counter-productive to declare Gambari's efforts a failure if there are any signs of movement. Achieving progress will be a gradual process, but time is of the essence as the people and the country cannot endure their trials much longer.
Reconciliation requires openness and transparency between the parties and with the whole process. It cannot work if confidentiality is used by one side to control the agenda, or to cover up unwillingness to compromise. Openness of information flows about reconciliation is also crucial, so the military authorities must be asked to ensure internet access for the public, and to increase freedom of information steadily. Transparency can be used to consolidate, rather than undermine, the whole process. Increased visits by international actors can contribute to this openness, and will act as reaffirmation of support for each step in the reconciliation process.
Any reconciliation process will need to be backed up by a detailed plan for demilitarisation (of the economy, the administration and politics). Without this, it is easy for the military to avoid commitments, and for the opposition to ask for too much, or to shift the goal posts.
Incentives for the military to hand over power are essential, but should not be promised or handed over prematurely, without concrete movement towards restoring constitutional authority under a democratically elected government. At the same time, any incentives offered must be adhered to and not withdrawn without cause, as may have happened in the past.
We may need some formal legal instrument (like the six-party talks with North Korea) to provide a solid basis for all sides to commit to.
Why not contemplate a formal treaty?
Trevor Wilson, a former Australian ambassador to Burma, is a visiting fellow at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University.