The US and its NATO allies cannot possibly criticise Russia's actions from the positions of international law or high moral ground not after the 1999 campaign against Serbia, an early example of unilateral humanitarian intervention bypassing the United Nations Security Council. If anything, Russia has a stronger case, given that the majority of civilian victims in Tskhinvali were actually Russian citizens.

The tragedy of South Ossetia puts a spotlight on unresolved security problems in post-communist Eurasia. Many newly independent states that were formed in the wake of the Soviet empire's collapse have experienced border disputes, irredentism, and separatism. Since the mid-1990s most of these conflicts have been frozen, but remain far from settled. It took Europe 30 years to develop commonly accepted norms and institutions to overcome the legacy of World War II and to provide for stable borders and lasting peace. However, the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe has proved inadequate in tackling the new generation of challenges, particularly those associated with unrecognised states in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. Voices of people living there are seldom heard outside their borders. Their destiny is conveniently (and erroneously) reduced to geopolitical competition between Russia and the West by international politicians and the media alike.

Saakashvili's self-serving motivation for the invasion of South Ossetia is a particularly disturbing aspect of the conflict. He has never concealed his ambition to reclaim breakaway territories by force. Since coming to power in 2003, he has presided over a tremendous military build-up, using US training and equipment, and spending more than 10 per cent of the country's annual GDP on the army. A small, victorious war would have justified his dictatorial style of rule, waning popularity, and domestic policy failures. The timing of the attack was precipitate. Saakashvili was desperate to bring separatists to heel before the NATO meeting in December, where his Government's application for membership would be considered. The precedent set by Kosovo's newly found sovereignty gave heart to the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who increased their diplomatic efforts aimed at formal independence. The Olympic Games were to provide a diversion.

The blitzkrieg did not work because Saakashvili failed to anticipate Russia's swift and effective reaction. Even then he tried to put a positive spin on his failure, shifting the discourse away from the butchering of Tskhinvali to the familiar turf of the Kremlin's aggression against proud little democratic Georgia. This shift has not convinced US President George W. Bush who, after all, is familiar with Saakashvili's refreshingly authoritarian and chauvinistic ways, but it has certainly captured the imagination of right-wing commentators, particularly Senator John McCain, whose pathological Russophobia requires little stimulation. The conflict is having an impact on Russian domestic politics, too. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who had been eclipsed by President Dmitry Medvedev as the country's chief diplomat and security supremo over the past months, is staging a comeback. Whisked away from Beijing as a specialist in Caucasian affairs, Putin is relishing an opportunity to reconnect with the generals and government officials in the area. There is no danger that Moscow will go beyond the restoration of the status quo in South Ossetia and embark upon territorial expansion or regime change in Georgia, but Medvedev's liberal course at home may experience some pressure.

The full ramifications of the ongoing conflict won't be known for some time. However, some lessons for the international community are already apparent.

There is a pressing need for the UN and other peak multilateral bodies to clarify international norms and procedures setting the limits to state sovereignty. Of course, this is an enormously complex issue which transcends the boundaries of the Transcaucasus, but the current crisis has contributed to the sense of urgency. The inconsistent and selective application of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention creates a situation where Russia in theory may become involved on behalf of oppressed minorities in a dozen former Soviet republics.

The time is ripe for a representative conference on Eurasian security on the lines of the Helsinki process in the 1970s. The new generation of conflicts in the post-communist space requires fresh approaches to governance, border issues, and peacekeeping.

Finally, and this is crucial, unrecognised states must be brought into the equation. Abkhazians and South Ossetians must have a say in their own future and should be recognised as equal partners if and when the negotiations about the future of the region get under way.

Dr Nourzhanov is a lecturer at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (Middle East and Central Asia), Australian National University.