A general invitation for submissions has been issued and more than 100 have been lodged. Heads of government agencies have been urged to encourage staff to have their say although, curiously, the agencies have not been specifically asked for their views; they should be, especially the central agencies. There have been meetings with sundry interested parties, including academics and at least one union, and the review panel's chairman has written to about 160 community groups, peaks bodies and business leaders pressing them for contributions.

Given the time allowed for this review, the panel will need to keep the accelerator flat to the boards. Not a lot of scope seems to have been allowed for that, however, as it has been made known that the panel's chairman, David Thodey, is expected to spend about 50 days on the task and the other members of the panel between 25 and 50.

The open call for submissions has allowed little time for those wanting to lob one in – fewer than six weeks. Without apparent irony, the panel has set the cut-off for their lodgment with precision: 11.59pm, Friday, July 13, 2018. That is an absurdly short period for those who wish to have their say to gather their thoughts and provide serious contributions. It makes the Prime Minister's undertaking that the review "will consult widely" look silly and it gives the impression that Thodey and his comrades are not much interested in others' views. That's probably unfair but the submission deadline is the kind of wound a half self-aware review would not inflict on itself. As a measure of good faith and to allow a reasonable opportunity for contributors to get serious, the closing time for submissions should be extended to 11.59pm, Friday, September 28, 2018.

Any review needs time to get going, of course, and greater strides are possible mid-race. The problem is that the review panel is in a sprint, it being due to report "in the first half of 2019". A House of Representatives and half-Senate election has to be held on or before May 18, 2019. If the Turnbull government would like to do something on the basis of the review panel's work, it would probably need to get its report in by the end of February next year at the latest. If so, the review has already used up more than 20 per cent of its time and it will need to put in a lot of Christmas-New Year effort to meet an end-of-February deadline. There's no chance the current government could make legislative changes as a result of the review.

Thus, the review might be wise, notwithstanding its wide and vague terms of reference, to concentrate on three or four major issues, such as: relations between governments, ministers and the public service; the capacity of central agencies to organise continuing service-wide improvement; merit staffing; and remuneration policy and practice. At all costs, it must avoid getting distracted by second-order issues like technological change, innovation and, dare it be said, agility.

It's difficult to come to grips with the quality of relations between government and ministers and the public service. That fluctuates with the players and issues involved, and perceptions are bedevilled by an inclination to imagine a roseate heyday when everything was the best in Gottfried Leibniz's best of all possible worlds. Leibniz only got to that point by getting God on his side, and it's unlikely He (or She if you wish) will be available for the review's eminent-persons panel.

Nevertheless, relations between ministers and the public service should be a primary focus of the review. It is the most important connection in government and there might be room to do better. The review might consider if abandoning fixed-period appointments for departmental secretaries, further limiting the number of ministerial staff but increasing the use of ministerial consultants who would work in departments might be useful.

Fixed-period appointments were introduced as a PR gesture to soften public perceptions about better pay for secretaries. Their effects on the capacity of officials to provide sound and forthright advice are uncertain, although in some cases it's unlikely to have been helpful, especially where the appointments are for less than five years. Few sensible private-sector organisations so indulge themselves as there's no support for the habit in rational personnel-management policy. Fixed-period appointments to statutory authority positions are entirely different as, given the strong tenure protections for these independent officers, unspecified periods of appointment would be a recipe for jobs for life.

The numbers of staff that ministers appoint to their offices has grown substantially over the last 40 years. While many of these have improved the working of government, the frequent whinges of those in the know suggest there's something in the caricature of the ministerial operative keen to pour scorn, often ill-informed, on departmental advice and damage relations between ministers and the public service. Codes of conduct for ministerial staff can only go so far. Therefore, the review panel might like to consider whether the number of staff that ministers can appoint to their offices should be reduced while posting more departmental officials to these offices. If ministers were concerned that this might overly restrict the availability of more direct political assistance on policy, they could appoint more ministerial consultants to work in departments, as provided by the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act.

Throughout its history, improvement in the public service as a whole has relied to a significant extent on effective coordination through central agencies, especially the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Public Service Commission and, before it, the Public Service Board and the Finance Department. At the moment, this work is supposed to be advanced through the Secretaries Board, a body chaired by the PM&C; secretary and containing all other secretaries, the public service commissioner and some other agency heads. Its functions are set out in the Public Service Act.

When asked about the Secretaries Board's recent achievements, PM&C; said in a statement that it "sets the overall direction of the APS, drives collaboration, prioritises collective resource use to achieve cross-boundary solutions, and gives priority to the creation and maintenance of a One-APS shared culture". Apart from the fact that PM&C;'s answer didn't mention a single achievement, what it claims for the board is inconsistent with its legislative responsibilities and would seem to displace much of the role of cabinet and ministers. Yet notwithstanding its pumped-up role, PM&C; secretary Martin Parkinson seems not to have given the Secretaries Board a single mention in his department's recent annual reports. So much for "setting overall direction ... blah, blah, blah".

If, as seems possible, central coordination of the public service in the age of devolution has fallen into a hole, the review panel might like to think about how things can be geed-up. It's hard to see how a coordinating board of more than 20 members can be effective. A smaller committee of the secretaries of PM&C; and Finance, the public service commissioner plus a couple of other secretaries on a rotation basis meeting every month to consider APS-wide issues might be a more helpful beast.

Central coordination is also hampered by the powerlessness of the Public Service Commission', which now much relies on exhortation and reporting to get its way. It should be augmented by the commissioner, rather than the PM&C; secretary, being the prime minister's primary adviser on secretary appointments and tenure.

The current state of merit staffing and means to improve it is the most important issue for the review. It is the cornerstone of an effective and efficient public service in which the community can place its trust. It's the reason for related provisions in the constitution and the Public Service Act.

There are grounds to suspect that these provisions are now being threatened by the increased use of consultants, contractors and labour-hire staff. Of course, it will be appropriate for these means to be used to do some of the Commonwealth's work. If, however, such staff are engaged to do work that is indistinguishable from that usually performed by public servants, the gates will be opened to corruption, nepotism and political patronage.

For example, it would be wrong in principle and probably law for consultants and contractors to be engaged in standard line positions in the public service, and for these people then to fill subordinate positions with people from their consulting and contracting firms without using the merit procedures that are fundamental to the Public Service Act. Moreover, consultants, contractors and labour-hire staff are not directly covered by the legislated public service values and associated disciplinary code, and they owe their fundamental loyalty to another employer. The more extensive their use, the more the APS's capacity is undermined.

Against this background, the review should look closely at staffing practices. It will have failed if it does not do so because nothing else can work properly in the public service – including with technology, innovation, agility and all other current fads – without a personnel system firmly anchored on merit and its supporting laws.

Finally, the review must help to fix up the APS's greatest festering wound: its remuneration policy. As is only too well known, it's based on the economic lunacy that improvements in remuneration should be directly linked to increases in productivity at the firm level. Panel members from the private sector will be able to say that their organisations aren't so foolish and Professor Glyn Davis will attest that the thought would never have occurred to the wise heads at his home base in the University of Melbourne.

As this column has laboured for many years, the fact is that productivity in Commonwealth departments can't be measured. To link remuneration to it is therefore self-evident nonsense and it's why enterprise-bargaining negotiations have been fraught, as negotiations about quantitative productivity improvement are impossible. So negotiations drag on – some for many years – until the parties find a way to cheat on the policy. The system can't work and it encourages dishonesty. It's a disgrace.

The solution is simple: public servants' remuneration should be based on a fair comparison with levels paid for comparable work by state governments and the private sector, as recommended by the Coombs report in 1976 and every other inquiry that's considered the matter. While a range of conditions like superannuation, leave and the like can be standard, pay should be fixed on the basis of occupational groups rather than individual agencies. That, of course, implies centralised negotiations covering the public service as a whole. It's more than time to bite that bullet.

To conclude, this column would like to say farewell to one of its most frequent visitors, Public Service Commissioner John Lloyd. As is well know, he's resigning and will leave early in August.

As is also well known, Lloyd is under investigation over allegations, the details of which have not been made public, but which have been around for about six months. These should have been investigated and finalised months ago. Lloyd can rightly feel aggrieved they have not been. With the appointment of a new Merit Protection Commissioner late last month, Lloyd has every right to expect that the allegations will be dealt with before he leaves. It will be most unfair to him if they're not.

To whatever he next turns his hand – perhaps a return gig at the Institute of Public Affairs or a monthly column in The Public Sector Informant – it's to be hoped that all will be prepared to wish him better luck than he's had as Public Service Commissioner.

Paddy Gourley is a former senior public servant. pdg@home.netspeed.com.au