Meanwhile, the cycle of North Korean rocket launches, punishing sanctions and nuclear tests adds to an already tense regional context.

Although China is still seen in Australia as a potential military threat, it is difficult to imagine the suspicion in which China was held during the height of the Cold War. The Great China Famine that killed many millions of people had ended only a decade earlier and the Cultural Revolution was not yet over, although its hysteria had somewhat subsided.

Even if the precise nature of these devastating events was not at the time widely understood in Australia, China nonetheless held a foreboding aura. The popular image of PRC was at the time not entirely dissimilar to the way in which North Korea is regarded today.

No two situations are identical. There was a certain mystique surrounding China in the minds of many Australians in the 1970s, but it would be difficult to find many Australians today who hold a positive view of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. China also represented a significant economic opportunity to Australia, particularly to the farming sector that was adversely affected by its decision in 1970 to stop importing Australian wheat. The economic opportunities that exist in North Korea at the moment are far more modest, and considered high risk.

Why should Australia try to pursue breakthrough diplomacy with a regime whose reputation is so odious? The failure of South Korea's ''Sunshine Policy'' and the subsequent acceleration of the DPRK's nuclear weapons and missile development program are frequently cited as proof of the impossibility of dealing with Pyongyang. It is unlikely, however, that a settlement of the Korean problem will ever be possible unless the security interests of North Korea, as well as those of the south, are taken into account.

Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy, which enjoyed much support in the Republic of Korea, brought about a considerable relaxation of tensions on the peninsula and corresponding benefits to both countries, unfolding against the background of the Clinton administration's efforts to improve relations with Pyongyang.

The collapse of the Sunshine Policy must be seen in the context of the Bush administration's inclusion of the DPRK along with Iraq and Iran in the ''Axis of Evil'' and the invasion of Iraq, Washington's scarcely veiled suggestions that North Korea could suffer a similar fate to Iraq, and the tightening of sanctions against Pyongyang.

The invasion of Iraq made a profound impression on the North Korean leadership. In his discussion with the then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi at the 2004 Japan-North Korea Summit the late Kim Jong-il expressed his concern that a non-nuclear North Korea could "end up like Iraq" and stated that "if our right to survive was guaranteed we would not need nuclear weapons''.

The leadership transition to Kim Jong-un was smooth, and attitudes to national security appear constant. The DPRK's nuclear weapons and missile development program will continue as long as it feels threatened. It is improbable that threats, economic exclusion and sanctions will moderate its behaviour.

There are few positive things to be said about the North Korean regime. The DPRK is a totalitarian, Stalinist, single-party state that maintains its legitimacy through the deification of the ruling family. Kim Jong-un appears obsessed with theme parks while his country remains in an abject condition. As International Herald Tribune journalist Roger Cohen recently noted, however, diplomacy that changes history is rarely conducted between friends.

Whitlam conceived a fundamental paradigm change in Australian foreign policy and went on to achieve it. Normalisation of diplomatic relations with Beijing, Hanoi and Pyongyang, withdrawing Australian troops from Vietnam, and proposals for an Asia Pacific Community represented monumental, heroic changes to our foreign policy orientation and have brought immense benefits to Australia and her people.

A shift in policy towards North Korea today will require a different type of visionary to Whitlam, one who would be motivated by a prudential rather than poetic purpose, and able to perceive the potentially calamitous result of the current thinking. Such a leader would need to act with determination to pull the region back from the precipice.

Maintaining a structure of deterrence is sound strategy. However, the coordinated international sanctions regime, political and cultural exclusion, and tacit threat of military action against North Korea increase the risk it will commit an irrational, aggressive act.

Sanctions punish the general populace and entrenches the regime. A radically different approach is urgently required. Is Australia still capable of the kind of diplomatic initiative undertaken by Whitlam?

Successive Labor governments have committed this country to sanctions against the DPRK more punishing than those imposed by almost any other Western power. In addition to the embargoes on military materials that are supported by the United Nations, the Labor government has imposed further sanctions aimed at the regime's inner circle. It also refuses visas to North Koreans, which eliminates the possibility of educational or cultural exchange. The political impact of such exchanges can often be extraordinarily beneficial. North Korea's third nuclear test, conducted on February 13 has made it even more unlikely that Australia will consider a different approach.

Recently, however, Foreign Minister Bob Carr has worked to convince the European Union to lift its sanctions against Burma, and in doing so has perhaps signalled a change in foreign policy towards authoritarian regimes. If Burma, why not North Korea? What options for creative diplomatic initiative could be considered by a contemporary Australian leader in search of a new approach? What do we want, what do they want, and what is in our common interest?

Australia's direct interests in North Korea are rather limited, but its broader economic interests would be immediately compromised if the region became unstable. There is also the question of Australia's influence and standing in the region, as an independent middle power. There are market opportunities, although admittedly modest at present. The goal of averting further famine in North Korea should also appeal to Australian policymakers.

What of North Korea? In the mid-1990s, a devastating famine claimed the lives of more than a million people in North Korea. The DPRK would benefit from agricultural capacity building and technical assistance that Australia could offer. Relaxing economic and cultural sanctions would also have an immediate, positive effect on the country. Of recent times, North Korea has also suffered regularly from natural disasters. Australia has generously contributed to relief and recovery funds for other nations of the region beset by similarly catastrophic events.

Can Australia - which enjoys exceptionally close ties with the US and Japan, and a strong trade relationship with China and South Korea, and has a vital interest in regional peace and security - play some role in helping defuse the volatile situation on the peninsular? The answer depends largely on whether the necessary political will exists. Whitlam combined vision with great political will. As tension on the Korean peninsula continues to rise, it is a legacy we should reflect on.

Andrew Hunter is chairman of the Australian Fabians.