OPINION
Subscribe now for unlimited access.
$0/
(min cost $0)
or signup to continue reading
The main concern for Australia when it comes to hypersonic weapons is that we have no effective defence against them - meaning that our command and control centres, naval surface vessels, air bases and intelligence facilities are all vulnerable to hypersonic attack.
The speed and manoeuvrability of hypersonic weapons make it very difficult to detect, track, target, and engage them - or even to confirm the intended target until it is too late to react. They are ideal first-strike weapons for blinding and incapacitating an opponent.
The main developers of these systems are Russia, China and the US.
While Australia is not a significant player in hypersonic weapon development, we have maintained an interest in hypersonic flight because of our geographic isolation. One day, hypersonic aircraft might conceivably carry passengers from Sydney to London in a few hours. Australia has also taken part in US tests of the weapons technology at the Woomera Test Range.
What then are hypersonic weapons?
"Hypersonic" means they can travel at more than Mach 5 or 1.7 kilometres per second - that is Sydney to Melbourne (713 kilometres) in seven minutes, but some hypersonic missiles are much faster than that (perhaps as fast as 33,340 kilometres per hour or 9.3 kilometres per second) and could cover the same distance in a blistering 76 seconds. By contrast, a rifle bullet travelling at 2,735 kilometres per hour or 760 metres a second - assuming constant velocity - would take over 15 minutes to travel from Sydney to Melbourne.
Hypersonic missiles come in two variants:
The first is hypersoniccruise missiles or HCMs that are launched from platforms - such as aircraft and ships and are powered by rockets or jets throughout their flight. They are much faster versions of existing cruise missiles, such as the US Tomahawk cruise missile, and are highly manoeuvrable. To attain Mach 5 and above, jet HCMs employ advanced, air-breathing jet engines, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets). Because HCMs are fuel-dependent, they have some range limitations.
The second and more challenging hypersonic threat from Australia's perspective comes from unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicles or HGVs that are launched into the upper atmosphere on ballistic missiles. After reaching an altitude between 64 and 160 kilometres above the earth's surface, the HGV separates from the booster and, propelled solely by momentum can race along the upper atmosphere for intercontinental distances.
Although unpowered, the HGV can manoeuvre in flight, using satellite guidance to re-enter the atmosphere and strike a target with precision at an ultrafast terminal speed, possibly as high as Mach 27.
Hypersonic weapons could be fitted with either conventional or nuclear warheads, but even in conventional form they are effective against hard targets because of the enormous kinetic energy generated by their high impact speed.
Russia currently leads the field in hypersonic weapon development. It operationally deployed air-launched Kinzhal HCMs in December 2017 (capable of reaching Mach 10), and in 2018 started serial production of Avangard HGVs. The Tsikron (Zircon) ship-launched HCM is likely to be test-launched from a naval vessel at the end of 2019.
The nuclear-armed Avangard HGV is, according to Russian officials, capable of sharp high-speed horizontal and vertical movements as it approaches its target, with a terminal speed of Mach 27, making it "absolutely invulnerable" to any defensive measures.
Since 2007, the US has collaborated with Australia on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program to develop hypersonic technologies. The most recent HIFiRE test, successfully conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 HGV, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies.
In addition to having one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world at the Woomera Test Range - Australia operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30.
However, the US is in catch-up mode when it comes to fielding operational hypersonic weapon systems. The US now plans to have them in place by 2022-23. Images have already been released of the air-launched AGM-183A Advanced Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) - an HCM reportedly capable of reaching Mach 20.
France and India have active hypersonic weapon development programs, and both are working independently with Russia, according to the US Rand Corporation.
India already has the short-range Shaurya HCM in operational service. It was developed by the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation for use against Pakistan. It has a range of 700 kilometres and can carry a conventional or nuclear warhead.
In the UK, Rolls-Royce, Reaction Engines and BAE Systems have recently been allocated £10 million to research, design and develop "high-Mach advanced propulsion systems".
Japan aims to have both HCMs and HGVs ready for testing by 2025. An HGV would provide Japan with offensive strike options to deter attacks on Japan's remote islands, especially the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The main concern for Australia will be China's hypersonic weapon capability. China has developed hypersonic weapons as a key element in its strategy to dominate the Asia-Pacific theatre.
China displayed 18 of its DF-ZF HGVs mounted on DF-17 solid-fuelled road-mobile short-range ballistic missiles on October 1 during its 70th National Day parade in Beijing. The DF-ZF officially entered operational service following the parade. It is believed to have a conventional warhead and terminal speed of Mach 5 to Mach 10. The DF-ZF is also reportedly capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
In the future, the DF-ZF could be fitted to longer-range Chinese ballistic missiles, such as the DF-31 ICBM, giving China the capability to strike targets at intercontinental distances.
China's primary hypersonic targets will probably be US command and control centres and aircraft carriers in the Asia-Pacific theatre.
Unless concerted international action is taken to limit hypersonic weapons, we risk another arms race as nations scramble to arm themselves with large numbers of them in the years ahead.
One of the greatest concerns about hypersonic weapons is the blurring between these weapons and nuclear weapons. Since hypersonics can be employed as first-strike weapons - and could be carrying nuclear warheads - a defending nation (like Pakistan) with only minutes to make a decision could assume the worst and initiate a nuclear response. So, what might start out as a conventional attack could very rapidly escalate into a nuclear exchange.
Given the limited time-frame available for targets to respond to incoming hypersonic weapons, it may also be necessary for defenders to adopt autonomous defensive systems (yet to be developed), because human decision-making would be too slow.
(The US is not expected to have a defensive capability against hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest.)
Hypersonic weapons could in the 2020s usher in a new age of nuclear instability. The push by militaries to get these very capable high-tech systems into service as soon as possible seems to be well ahead of any consideration of the implications of their development.
Policymakers do not yet seem to have realised they are not just another smart weapon.
- Clive Williams is a visiting professor at the ANU's Centre for Military and Security Law and former Defence Intelligence Organisation senior arms control analyst.