They sought not just a diagnosis but a cure, challenging me to come up with solutions - constitutional, revolutionary and intermediate - perhaps exploring the faceless political mechanisms behind the political parties.

This is a challenge worth taking up, even at the risk of seeming more foolish. Though I may disappoint, as I am always cautious about referring to so-called Golden Ages when everything was fine. Moreover, I believe that reform starts at home, and we all must look closely at ourselves, not just at others.

The starting point for fixing our political system should not be constitutional or revolutionary reform, but short-term and intermediate suggestions. Constitutional reform is so difficult under our constitution that it is a road to heartbreak, while revolutionary reform is not the Australian way and risks replacing one bad system with another.

The political classes are the starting point, because they are the ones who either hold the levers of power or may hold them after the next election.

My shopping list for the Morrison government, and for a possible Albanese government, involves both legislation of new reforms and working within the existing rules.

The first part of the list consists of sensible institutional reforms by legislation of already known improvements, bearing in mind they will be fiercely resisted by the status quo defenders.

Firstly, legislate for a federal Independent Commission Against Corruption with serious teeth. This would involve broad scope, including politicians and public servants, transparent proceedings and strong powers. The government has already made a promise, but has failed to act.

Secondly, strengthen the regulation of lobbyists beyond paid intermediaries to company employees and pressure groups. The ABC's Four Corners program on Monday night about the Australian-owned Greensill finance group showed once again how lobbying by senior retired ministers in Britain and Australia is not captured by existing legislation.

Thirdly, strengthen political donation regulations to throw greater light on the exercise of inappropriate corporate power. This should involve real-time revelation of all political donations, rather than long delays.

Fourthly, strengthen the powers of and provide increased funding for existing investigatory and regulatory bodies, including the office of the Auditor-General.

Fifthly, demand greater protection for whistleblowers, because insiders can bravely reveal unethical conduct.

Sixthly, reduce the politicisation of the public service. Departmental secretaries and senior public servants who are too close to the government of the day are part of the problem.

Finally, legislate to reveal the internal workings of political parties, making them subject to normal rules of legal and accountable behaviour.

The second part of the shopping list involves achieving greater transparency and accountability within the existing system.

Firstly, hold ministers responsible. The present government has a deplorable record of protecting ministerial misconduct. A vote of no confidence in a minister in the Senate should trigger compulsory sacking or resignation, even when the minister is protected in the House of Representatives.

Secondly, demand greater accountability of the Australian Federal Police when they are serving the political needs of the government rather than the common good. At present there is little transparency.

Thirdly, call off the legal dogs pursuing whistleblowers and lawyers like Bernard Collaery, and hampering press efforts to investigate the government. Such action should be a government priority.

Fourthly, apply strong measures, including sanctions against guilty individuals, to eliminate the unsafe environment for women in Parliament House and within political parties.

Fifthly, reduce cabinet's impenetrability to freedom-of-information requests. The secrecy has outgrown its initial justification, and is now frequently just a protection against revelations of government misconduct.

There are two main ingredients standing in the way of such reforms: self-interest and disinterest.

The self-interest of those in power: the status quo protects them.

The self-interest of those seeking power within our party system: they believe the status quo will protect them should they ever gain power.

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The self-interest of those outside Parliament who gain from the status quo: these corporate interests (not just business but others) are within the inner circle and support and exploit its continuance.

The self-interest of ordinary citizens who relish the fact that their own party holds power by hook or by crook.

The disinterest and ignorance of those ordinary citizens who have given up on politics, or for whom politics has never been part of their lives. Their lives are occupation, family and friends, spirituality and recreation.

There are two main ingredients of possible reform: external and internal. Ideally these elements work together.

One external element is people power. Movements for change can develop the momentum to force those in office to act. The sanction is the threat of removing the political class from office. But a word of caution: such momentum must be huge and long-lasting, and probably cross-generational.

The other is reform from within, led by champions of reform who are willing to sacrifice their own careers to bring about change. This assumes that reform from within is possible.

Movements for change must face the self-interest and disinterest of ordinary voters. We should never pass over our own complicity in the dire state of affairs. We cannot escape responsibility by claiming helplessness in the face of greater forces.

Internal reform must involve disruption of the existing system. Party leaders must be brave enough to strike out alone. Backbench MPs must demand action, install reformist leaders and sacrifice their own careers if necessary. Voters must support such leaders. We all have a role.