After all, what do you give a superpower which can make or buy anything its citizens may want? This concern is hardly new. As long ago as 1792, the Chinese emperor spurned British gifts of a telescope, planetarium, artillery and air pumps by declaring that he "set no value on objects strange and ingenious".

Questions about alliance management are especially pertinent after the predictable, unavoidable collapse of Afghanistan. Critics in the cheap seats question American resolve as vociferously as they did after the fall of Saigon in 1975. A more reasonable judgment might commend leaders (Gerald Ford like Joe Biden, pallbearers both) prepared to cut rather than compound losses and tragedies. The two presidents were willing to debunk the cruel pretence that you can build a nation in countries where the government scuttles and its army refuses to fight. Both acknowledged that credibility leaches away while fighting a war you did not start, cannot afford, and cannot win.

Nations' interest in seeking alliances is simply explained. The deal is as set out by the street gang, the Jets, in West Side Story. "If the shit hits the fan, you got brothers around ... When company's expected, you're well protected." To achieve those worthy goals, junior alliance partners might note seven suggestions.

First: Try not to end up like the Melians. In addition to fretting about a debacle in Kabul last month, policymakers should review events on the Aegean island of Melos two and a half millennia ago. Confronted with certain destruction, mass murder, rape and slavery, the Melians appealed to the aggressor's reputational risk, to principles of "fair play and just dealing", to the virtues underpinning neutrality, and to problems inherent in forcing others to act "against their intentions and inclinations". In response, the Athenians reminded the Melians of "a general and necessary law ... to rule whatever one can", bluntly maintaining that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must".

In 1938 the Nazis surely berated the leaders of Austria and Czechoslovakia in similar terms. Melos would today urge the Security Council to "remain seized" of the matter, invoke the global rules-based order and initiate legal action against Athens. Alliances remain strong because countries recognise how vain Melian-style protestations would be.

Second: Do not be sucked in by fancy labels. Alliances with grand titles like entente cordiale, "friend of China" or special relationship have the same juridical weight as nominating BFFs. For decades the British deluded themselves that the special quality in their trans-Atlantic relationship was that they would always prove more nuanced and worldly than the Americans. They lied to themselves, plainly the most heinous diplomatic sin. With Iraq, Tony Blair ended up as a compliant lapdog rather than a discerning seeing-eye dog. Contemporary silliness includes the emergence of "comprehensive strategic partnerships", an abuse of two adjectives and a noun in one phrase alone.

Third: Read the fine print. Consider the ANZUS treaty, where the terms, type and timing of any collective assistance are left undefined, with the sole obligation on partners being to be seen "to consult together". Examine as well the NATO treaty bargain. Since no Western conventional weapons could halt a Soviet attack, collective security meant accepting the possible detonation of American nuclear weapons across swathes of Europe. Would Washington bomb Russia over an incursion into Estonia?

Fourth: Remember that sycophancy just does not pay. Nobody coming to power in Washington will thank us for fighting in Iraq or Vietnam. Borrowing an American president's campaign slogan to express unthinking subservience, "All the Way with LBJ", was as demeaning as Bob Menzies with Suez in 1956 - duped by his patrons, humiliated, alienating much of the world but remaining slavishly obsequious.

Bigger powers can also shame themselves. Remember the show bags offered to Donald Trump by pandering allies: attendance at the Bastille Day parade (France); holding hands (Britain); commissioning paintings of him (Vietnam); sending him golf clubs, statues and antique rifles.

Fifth: Avoid any attempt at nation-building. No nation was confected and constructed by outsiders. Many have been assisted (as with the Marshall Plan), some bolstered with military guarantees or subsidies, others guided remotely for better or worse. Nonetheless, nation-building is essentially DIY.

Sixth: Neutrality is not worth it. No nation that declined to fight Hitler's wickedness kept its self-respect intact. Neutrals should invite their kids to remind them of the story of the Little Red Hen, whose friends would not help with any of the work but expected a share of the spoils.

Seventh: Think for yourself. Once more, we might learn from New Zealand, whose Foreign Service is superior because its officers focus on issues which directly relate to their country's interests. Moreover, those staff are rusted-on patriots, a force multiplier in itself. Clinging to great and powerful friends has paid dividends for Australia, but also led us into Gallipoli, subordination to lethal British generals, foolish belief in the impregnability of Singapore, Maralinga, childish dismay when Britain entered the European Economic Community, then Vietnam and Iraq.

Carping about the Americans will never cease - whether about credibility, exceptionalism, perceived naivety, or disposition to invite people to reason together. As Melians might remark, what petty qualms those are.