That didn't happen, because the battle turned out to be a disaster for Japan. But how much easier it would have been for Tokyo if it had gained control of south Pacific islands before the war.

That brings us to this week's news that the government has arranged for Telstra to buy Digicel Pacific, the dominant telecommunications company of the south Pacific. In doing so we've headed off feared acquisition of the business by China Mobile, a Chinese state telco.

Chinese companies have been highly active in the Pacific, not just the south Pacific, for at least 15 years, at first just looking for profits but now obviously under instructions from Beijing to build up presence and influence. The economic dependence on China of Oceania's little countries keeps rising, local leaders are happy to take bribes, and Beijing has received their diplomatic support.

China has gained influence also by building infrastructure, though not always very well. It provides cheap finance for this.

Beijing's weight in the south Pacific is a problem for two main reasons: it might set up military bases on some of the islands; and activities of its companies promote corruption and raise a risk of state failure.

Telstra's acquisition attends to the specific problem of preventing a Chinese company from buying Digicel and using it to collect data within and passing through South Pacific networks.

The military issue is the one that worries the government most, says Lowy Institute analyst Jonathan Pryke, who rates it as a very low risk. South Pacific countries, such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Fiji, are quite uninterested in militarisation of their territory, he points out.

Also, China is working much harder at extending its influence in the north Pacific, says Graeme Smith, a Pacific expert at the Australian National University. That's the route the US Navy would take if it had to rush westward to help Taiwan.

Still, the Australian government is right to worry about the south Pacific military risk.

For example, China might set up bases with its usual technique of taking a succession of small steps. It might begin with something laudable such as a search and rescue airfield, justified by nearby operations of Chinese fishing fleets. Then the airfield might be progressively expanded, with additions to its runway, parking areas, fuel storage and maintenance facilities.

Even if Chinese warplanes were not permanently kept there, they could arrive suddenly and without permission in a pre-war crisis, along with loads of weapons and defensive missile systems.

Logistics challenges would prevent prolonged sustainment of that presence. Nonetheless, Australia could suddenly find squadrons of long-range Chinese aircraft wielding cruise missiles in strike range of Queensland - and sitting on our supply route from the US.

Does that sound wildly speculative? Well, consider last year's announcement of expanded coverage of our three super-long-range Jindalee radars.

These mighty sensors look north and west, because those have been the only plausible directions from which a threat to this country could emerge. But now the Jindalee installation at Longreach, Queensland, will be modified also to look east, over the south Pacific.

Admittedly, there are two other reasons for the system to monitor that area: for warning of cruise missiles inbound from a Chinese submarine; and monitoring the doings of any Chinese aircraft carrier operating there.

As in earlier discussions of strategic scenarios in this column, we are talking here about the possibility of Australia being on a military front line, an idea that most readers will find unfamiliar and disturbing. I'm sorry, but we have to get used to it.

Less aggressive than bases but still worrying would be Chinese installations on south Pacific islands for collecting radio signals, communicating with satellites and monitoring those of the US. All this could be done surreptitiously or with some peaceful excuse.

The more immediate problem is bribery, typically for construction projects. Chinese companies are hardly strangers to bribes at home. In fact, they're pleasantly surprised by how cheaply they can buy south Pacific officials, says Smith, who can't see a way of stopping the activity.

Corruption undermines effective government. Pryke worries we could eventually see a case of state failure, requiring an intervention such as the one that Australia led in the Solomon Islands in 2003. And we would certainly want to lead it, not let China take over.

MORE AGE OF THE DRAGON:

Australia woke up to the growing problem in the Pacific in 2017, just as it was finally becoming aware of the challenge from China more generally. We're now helping our small neighbours more, thanks to our Pacific Step Up program, which includes increased aid. So we're balancing China's influence better than before, but by no means completely.

The Digicel deal should itself become a kind of aid program.

Telstra will acquire the company with Australian government financing in what is a very Chinese-style move. Beijing routinely gets large companies to do its work for it, internationally as well as at home.

Unfortunately, Digicel Pacific is well known in its markets for predatory pricing, says Smith. That will be no good for Australia's reputation. If the government's current agreement with Telstra does not already require improved service, lower prices or both, then we need another that does, and the government will have to pay.

Besides, if Digicel does not offer good value for islanders' money, a Chinese company will soon see an opportunity to step in.