Last week week, Prime Minister Sogavare announced he had also accepted an offer from the Chinese government to provide policing equipment and police officers to support Solomon Islands' national police force.

This is a significant step in the relationship between Solomon Islands and China, and will likely exacerbate the political unrest in Honiara and across the nation. It will have also caught the Australian government off guard. Like Australia's deployment, it is unclear when Chinese police officers and equipment will leave the Solomon Islands.

Australia's willingness to provide support to Solomon Islands demonstrates our interest in maintaining regional security. Insecurity in the region is not in Australia's national interest.

The community violence seen in Solomon Islands leading to this latest deployment is largely based on disputes between those from Guadalcanal and Malaita. These disputes are based on long-held grievances around perceived social, political and economic inequities, with both sides believing they have been mistreated by the other.

Australia and 14 other regional neighbours were involved in the original deployment starting in 2003. Australia contributed the largest number of personnel and greatest level of funding, estimated to be over $2.5 billion. This deployment was about maintaining regional security, but was also a humanitarian response in the context of significant community violence over a preceding five-year period that had left 200 dead and tens of thousands displaced.

This current deployment, though, is occurring in a different international context to the last. The almost immediate response to relatively low levels of community violence (as compared to the 1998-2003 period of "tensions") reflects this deployment is more political in nature.

While the current local violence again is based primarily along the same ethnic lines as previously, the local and international security implications have been complicated by the recent rise of China as a large aid donor to the region and its growing influence within the Pacific.

In 2019, Solomon Islands ceased recognising Taiwan and instead recognised only China, thus ending a 36-year relationship with Taiwan. This new relationship with China was accompanied by a significant increase in assistance and investment in the country through China's Belt and Road Initiative.

This recognition was also not universally accepted within Solomon Islands, with the leader of the Malaita province publicly rejecting the recognition of China and seeking to maintain relationships with Taiwan. Support for Taiwan by Malaita leaders continues today.

In recent years, Chinese assistance and investment has been increasing at a rapid pace across the Pacific. This money has generally funded large infrastructure projects such as roads, airports, and ports. Concerns have been raised by communities across the Pacific as to the long-term consequences of this Chinese assistance, and the possibility of long-term debt. Across the Pacific there is limited transparency related to much of this investment. In contrast, Australia's aid has traditionally supported programs focused on health, education, and other social programs.

There is no doubt the Pacific has now become a region in which China is seeking to increase its political influence. The latest offer of support, consisting of Chinese police officers in Solomon Islands, is a demonstration of this interest.

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Given Australia's long history in the region, any increase in Chinese influence in the Pacific can arguably only come at the expense of Australia. Indeed, it appears Australia's influence is already waning in some countries. Research undertaken in Vanuatu, for example, shows that while local community members hold Australia's aid program and assistance in high regard, these same community members believe China has greater influence within their country.

Australia's immediate response to the request for support by the Solomon Islands government very much reflects Australia's determination to maintain influence within the Pacific. While the level of violence that ultimately led to a 14-year deployment of Australian personnel is not as intense now as then, the risk of mission escalation and longer-term commitment appears to have been ignored due to a determination to be the first responder.

China's offer of support, and its acceptance by the Solomon Islands government, will be causing enormous concern to Australia and its international security partners.

Australia's influence in the region is not something it will willingly cede, but nor is it something it can expect not to be challenged by others with similar goals. As such, it would be reasonable to expect the Australian forces who arrived in Solomon Islands one month ago to not only be there longer than we might have initially expected, but potentially also continue growing in number.

Australia certainly won't leave Honiara unless China does first. As such, it may be another long deployment.