The gap between immediate risk and long-term capability is concerning

As such, it's not unexpected that the NDS largely echoed the findings of the DSR in emphasising a strategy of deterrence by denial and building a capability for "impactful projection" for the ADF. This approach makes a great deal of sense for Australia's strategic circumstances.

But the NDS and IIP must be more responsive to immediate and short-term threats facing Australia, which demand greater attention to building up ADF capability sooner within this decade.

The challenge facing Defence, as it implements the NDS and IIP, is how best to respond to real and intensifying short-term risks to Australia's security happening now and through the remainder of this decade.

As with the 2023 DSR, there is a clear disconnect between the NDS' very effective analysis of the rapid deterioration of Australia's strategic outlook that is occurring now, versus the proposed prioritisation of ADF capability development that emphasises longer-term capability development within the 2030s.

Both documents once again reinforce the importance of acquiring nuclear powered but conventionally armed submarines and building an expanded navy. Investment in nuclear submarines and a larger navy are also matched by greater long-range strike capability for the ADF.

The NDS is clearly and correctly focusing on Australia as a maritime power, with defence challenges emerging predominately in a maritime operational environment, even though the ADF embraces what is known as "multi-domain" operations across air, sea, land, space and cyberspace.

The NDS and IIP also once again reinforce the importance of impactful projection and re-announce previously announced acquisitions of long-range standoff missiles. These include Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) for Navy Hobart class air warfare destroyers, potentially the Hunter class frigates - which won't start appearing until the early 2030s at best - and of course the future Virginia class nuclear submarines from 2033 onwards.

Other strike capabilities re-announced in the IIP include the long-range anti-ship missile and joint air-to-surface missile extended range for the Air Force, as well as the precision strike missile and HIMARS for the Army. And the IIP correctly increases funding for autonomous systems - drones - such as the MQ-28 Ghost Bat for Air Force and the Ghost Shark extra-large UUV.

Investment in autonomous systems is a smart move, as it opens up an opportunity for the ADF to restore mass to its force structure, through low-cost, high volume local manufacture. That aligns well with the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) enterprise, which is emphasised in both documents. Australia needs to fully support both GWEO and local development of sophisticated armed drones and restoring mass makes more sense than continued reliance on exquisite and expensive crewed platforms that can only be acquired in small numbers.

Of course, funding is important, and the NDS and IIP do highlight an increase in funding, with an additional $50.3 billion over 10 years.

But most of that funding is back-ended into the 2030s, with not enough funding brought forward to cover urgent capability development needed now. Over the forward estimates period of the next four years, spending is only set to grow by 2.4 per cent or $5.7 billion on top of previous funding plans, and that doesn't account for inflation which could grow through any number of different global and domestic challenges.

Also what's clearly missing from the IIP in particular is a clear explanation of what is being cancelled, scaled back or delayed to cover the limited extra funding provided in the IIP to support the NDS. Subsequent media interviews by both Defence Minister Richard Marles and Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy gave a limited picture of what cuts might emerge.

For example, it was revealed that a fourth squadron of F-35A Joint Strike Fighters would be deferred - most likely cancelled, and the RAAF's F/A-18F Super Hornet and E/A-18G Growlers will be kept in service through to the 2040s.

Also there is significant reduction to investment in integrated air and missile defence, which wasn't made clear in the IIP, in spite of the 2023 DSR highlighting the urgency of fielding such a capability, and the importance of this capability being demonstrated daily in Ukraine and more recently in Israel. No doubt there are other capability projects facing demise that will be revealed over time.

But it's the gap between responding to immediate risks versus supporting long-term plans that are the most concerning. Planning to counter coercion in the 2030s means little if Australia's security is threatened in the second half of this decade as a result of a major crisis in the Indo-Pacific region.

China's ambitions to impose unification on Taiwan, if necessary through military force, and China's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, confront the security interests of the region, and by extension, Australia.

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In spite of Marles seemingly dismissing such a prospect in his address to launch the NDS and IIP, and criticising those who warn of worst possible contingencies in the next few years, such a crisis would directly affect Australia's security.

The NDS explains how by quite correctly identifying the importance of the security of sea lanes of communication upon which Australia depends to ensure access to critical resources, notably fuel, and sustaining the flow of trade and resources without disruption, as a key Australian interest.

In a major power war between China and the United States over Taiwan, those sea lanes could easily and deliberately be disrupted, and Australia's northern bases and approaches threatened.

Marles correctly noted that an invasion of Australia is exceedingly unlikely, because an adversary "can cause so much damage to our country without ever having to step foot on Australian soil".

That's a sensible observation. Yet, it seems we are relying on a strategy of hope that nothing untoward will happen in this decade.