Australia's electronic spy agency should sharpen its cyber weaponry with reforms that could attract the nation's top technical operators and ease restrictions on information shared with the private sector, a defence think tank says.
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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute in a review of the government's readiness for cyber warfare released on Tuesday suggested it consider looking at a "substantial" increase in spending on cyber to grow its arsenal against future adversaries.
Its report came after Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in 2016 confirmed Australia had an offensive cyber capability, and as electronic warfare emerges as a new battleground on the international stage.
The institute identified weaknesses in the nation's cyber operations - those that manipulate, deny, disrupt, degrade or destroy targeted computers or networks - saying the Australian Signals Directorate faced competition from private companies in attracting talent, and that the government needed to review how information was classified.
It told the government to invest in training and raise salaries at the ASD, a move the report said would be easier as it became a statutory agency following an intelligence review released last year.
The signals directorate, home to Australia's cyber offensive operations, should also develop an alumni network and culture that allowed former staff to return in new roles after a stint in the private industry, the think tank said.
"A pool of alumni working as cleared reservists could also be used as an additional workforce without the significant investment required in conducting entirely new clearances," it said.
The report urged a review of classification levels, adding to work positioning the Australian Cyber Security Centre to keep the private sector better informed of operations.
"The government should continue to scope the potential benefits from lowering the classification of information associated with offensive cyber operations," it said.
"There are benefits in operating at the 'secret' level for workforce generation and training, and providing a ‘halfway house’ to usefully employ incoming staff as they wait during vetting procedures.
"More broadly, excessive classification slows potentially valuable two-way information exchange with the information security community."
The government should review laws governing oversight for the ASD as cyber is used in conflict and the Australian Defence Force needs to make battlefield decisions without reaching back to national authorities, the think tank said.
Defence Minister Marise Payne said the government in 2016 publicly acknowledged that Australia had offensive cyber capabilities able to be used against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, to protect Australian government networks, and to counter serious offshore cyber-criminals.
"By ‘offensive cyber’ capability, we mean that the Australian government has the capability to disrupt, deny or degrade the computers or computer networks of adversaries," she said.
"This increased transparency and openness is, however, necessarily balanced against the need to protect specific technical capabilities and operational matters.
"The government has been clear on the nature of its offensive cyber capability and the Australian government’s commitment to the international rules-based order and Australia’s obligations under international law.”
The Department of Defence acquired its information warfare division, headed by Major General Marcus Thompson, in July 2017.
