Whatever one's view of the dictatorial and brutal nature of the Assad regime, it continues to command widespread support from the Alawite, Christian and Druze minorities, who fear retribution from a Sunni majority in the event of the regime's fall. This, together with the fact that military-security forces have so far remained largely loyal to the regime, means that Assad and his top brass feel quite confident domestically for the time being. Meanwhile, the Iranian and Hezbollah support, Iraqi government's sympathy, and Russian and Chinese political/diplomatic protection that the regime enjoys have proved invaluable. Why are these regional and international actors persistent in their backing of the regime?

They do not necessarily appear to view the Assad regime as indispensable. Their main concern appears to be how to secure a resolution of the conflict that would not seriously undermine their geostrategic interests. Tehran has invested heavily in its strategic partnership with the Syrian regime under Bashar and his father, Hafiz al-Assad, since the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 that resulted in the toppling of the Shah's pro-Western regime and its replacement with Ayatollah Khomeini's Shi'ite Islamic government, with an anti-US and anti-Israeli posture.

Partnership with Damascus has been crucial to Tehran's organic relations with Hezbollah as a powerful force in Lebanon and against Israel and the US in conformity with Iran's regional interests. Also, it has served Tehran well in securing strong political leverage in Iraq. All of this, plus US policy debacles in Iraq, Lebanon and on the Israeli Palestinian front, have formed the important pillars of Iran's growing regional influence. From Tehran's perspective, it is important to ensure the strength of its position vis-a-vis Iran's Gulf Arab adversaries, led by Saudi Arabia, and the US and Israel.

Similar geostrategic considerations have also been at work in shaping Russian and Chinese attitudes, although on a wider scale. Russia has been Syria's main arms supplier and a ranking trading partner. Until early 2011, Syria was Russia's seventh largest arms importer, with some $4 billion worth of arms contracts concluded.

In 2010, Russia's export of non-military goods to Syria amounted to $1.1 billion and Russian investment in the country reached more than $19 billion. Russia also maintains a naval base in the port city of Tartus on the Mediterranean, which it inherited from the Soviet era, but has expanded and modernised according to its needs since then. Similarly, China has had very lucrative trade ties with Syria. In 2010 the volume of trade between the two sides amounted to about $2.2 billion, mostly in favour of China. Beijing has been involved in Syria's oil industry and provided assistance to the country's development of a ballistic missile program.

While these military and trade interests are important, beyond them lie Russian and Chinese desires now to ''play ball'' with the US for regional and global influence. Russia has shunned the US over its deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe, and its establishment of military bases in Central Asia. These are regions that Moscow has traditionally regarded as Russia's zone of influence and security. Nor has it viewed with any degree of magnanimity the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's expansion into former Soviet East European satellites and the organisation's operations to bring about regime change in Libya last year. By the same token, Beijing has developed serious concerns about the US shifting its strategic weight to Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region in pursuit of a perceived policy of containment of China.

Russia and China also seem to be troubled by the US and its allies' threats to Iran over the country's nuclear program, which Tehran claims to be for peaceful purposes, but the West and Israel suspect to be for producing nuclear weapons. While both powers have joined the West in opposing Iran's acquisition of military nuclear capability, they hold Iran to be a significant strategic prize and do not want to see any change in the regional strategic status quo. Meanwhile, the Syrian conflict carries the potential to assume a wider dangerous regional dimension. Damascus has now made a public admission that it possesses chemical and biological weapons. Although it has promised not to use them against the Syrian people, it has vowed to deploy them against external aggression. Israel has been quick to declare that if needed it would act in order to prevent such weapons from falling into the hands of Hezbollah or any other hostile force.

For the conflict to end sooner rather than later, a political settlement is needed that could reassure Syrian minorities of a promising future, and recognise Iranian, Russian and Chinese wider concerns and interests. This means that the US and Russia, plus China and Iran, would need to reach a grand bargain, whereby Washington could reassure Moscow, Beijing and Tehran of their interests and the latter three let Assad leadership go in favour of a government of national coalition. The alternative is continued fighting, bloodshed and destruction until either the Assad regime or the opposition prevail.

Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and central Asia) at the Australian National University.