No drills or simulations for emergency situations on Dreamworld rides have been put in place since the October 2016 tragedy that killed four people, a coronial inquest has heard.
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Senior ride operator Tim Williams - who was operating the Thunder River Rapid Rides in the morning before the tragedy that killed Sydney mother Cindy Low, Canberra visitor Kate Goodchild, her brother Luke Dorsett and his partner Roozi Araghi - said there had been some “talk” of introducing drills but nothing had been put in place.
“Have you yourself taken part in any drills or simulations for emergency situations?” barrister Matthew Hickey, representing the family of Cindy Low, asked Mr Williams.
“No,” he replied.
Mr Williams - no relation to junior ride operator Courtney Williams who gave evidence Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning - said that since the tragedy Dreamworld employees had been rostered on 15 minutes earlier to attend morning briefings.
The briefings covered any ride shut-downs, late start-ups or other issues around the park, he said.
Mr Williams is still employed at Dreamworld as a ride operator, and confirmed his 2016 police statement that he had noticed newer employees were often promoted to higher levels of operator pay over longer-serving employees.
Noting junior operator Courtney Williams’ testimony that she didn’t know the surnames of several senior Dreamworld employees who spoke to her in the aftermath of the disaster, Mr Hickey asked Mr Williams if Dreamworld held any team-building exercises.
“I can’t think of any specific team-building exercises I’ve done, but we do occasionally get together outside of work as large groups,” Mr Williams said.
The question of the e-stop button at the unload area, which would have stopped the conveyor belt in two seconds, was also put to Mr Williams.
Asking if he had read the October 18 memo that instructed employees not to press the button unless the main operating console was not accessible, and only when guest or staff safety was at risk, Mr Williams said he believed the language was a “negative” instruction rather than a “positive”.
Mr Hickey asked if Mr Williams would have felt any hesitation pressing the e-stop considering the memo’s strict language, for fear of consequences from management.
Under an objection from Dreamworld lawyers, Coroner James MacDougall said the question was relevant to the “state of mind of operators”.
“No, I wouldn’t hesitate to press an emergency button based on consequences,” Mr Williams said.
Mr Williams told the court at some point during his training, he was made aware of a potential issue of rafts tipping at the base of the conveyor belt, before loading onto the conveyor.
On the morning of the tragedy, Mr Williams was the first ride operator beginning his shift at 9.45am, arriving at the Thunder River Rapids Ride while Courtney Williams and Amy Crisp were completing Ms Williams’ training session.
When he started the ride, he noticed the south pump’s power level was fluctuating between 490 and over the safe threshhold of 500 amps, while the north pump was settled at a more typical 410 amps.
Mr Williams made a phone call to report the issue, and an engineer named Frank came to inspect the south pump.
By that time, the pump was running at a more normal level and no action was taken.
Mr Williams was excused, and fellow senior Dreamworld ride operator Chloe Louise Brix took the stand late on Thursday afternoon.
Ms Brix, who had been trained on the Thunder River Rapids Ride in mid-2013, was operating the ride earlier in the day before the tragedy.
She told the inquest that she was aware certain rafts would become heavier as the day went on and would rest on the rails.
“When they were heavier they would sit on the rails and they were harder to move,” Ms Brix said.
Asked if she raised this with supervisors, she said yes, but to her knowledge no action was taken.
The inquest continues on Friday.
