Afghanistan: It's time to examine the why behind what occurred and what went wrong

It's been the perfect opportunity to slip out something you want glossed over.

That's why it's worth giving Defence Minister Linda Reynolds a bit of credit.

She's done absolutely the right thing by holding off releasing the report into war crimes committed by Australian forces in Afghanistan, instead of using the cover of the pandemic to camouflage its release.

This investigation, conducted by NSW Appeal Court judge (and Major General) Paul Brereton has been thorough and detailed.

It was almost ready to be released earlier this year when an ABC television report prompted more soldiers to come forward.

Their testimony has now been incorporated into the final document.

They say a fish rots from the head - but that wasn't true in this case.

Commanders - particularly former Special Forces commander Jeff Sengleman and Defence Force chief Angus Campbell - pushed this investigation to its conclusion.

Its allegations go to the very core of our military ethos. We've always assumed Australian soldiers are, somehow, different.

They're volunteers, effective, acting in a united and disciplined way, using violence but only to achieve peace, but this report proves there's nothing exceptional about the Aussie digger. All war is terrible. It makes ordinary people do shocking things.

What's important now is how we incorporate these lessons into our broader understanding of society.

It can't just be ignored, with the (possible) perpetrators of crimes dismissed as bad apples who don't reflect on the rest of us.

This is not the sort of issue that can be dealt with in a couple of paragraphs of print.

It is, in fact, fundamental to our failure in Afghanistan.

Something went very wrong when a clear mission to assist a country apparently dissolved into inflicting senseless terror and potential unlawful killings or murder.

No single factor can be isolated and blamed for what occurred in Afghanistan.

Of course discipline should have prevented what happened and of course not everyone who served can be tarred with the same brush - but that's exactly the point.

The failure was systemic: it was inherent in the deployment.

Strong leadership couldn't, by itself, rescue a mission that was ill-defined and incapable of being achieved.

Nor could the inherent strength of the army's organisational culture protect individuals who were sent to fight for year after year with no apparent progress; sent to achieve a task that could never be accomplished.

Translating any idea, or mission, into reality and ensuring it's completed effectively requires remarkable unity and focus.

Unless three factors are working in unison, everything falls apart.

The mission must be clearly stated; capable of being broken down into coherent objectives; and these must be achievable, directly and obviously related to the mission.

Leadership needs to articulate this and drive implementation. Critically, the organisation must embrace this task.

Just look at the way the country's dealt with COVID-19.

Go back to that weekend in early March.

Scott Morrison was pledging to attend his Cronulla Sharks game.

It was hard to feel this was a leader who was treating the virus as an existential danger.

Later he decided not to go but his relaxed attitude had filtered through to the bureaucracy and within organisations.

Unfortunately this was when the Ruby Princess came in to dock.

NSW Health, the Border Force, the Ports Authority, and everyone else seems to have taken their cue from the PM's comments a week before.

The need for focus and rigour on the dock wasn't enforced precisely because the urgency hadn't been transmitted from the top.

A similar dynamic may well explain why some particular nursing homes or abattoirs have similarly become epicentres for the spread of the virus.

We can explain cases of individual transmission by exploring and following reasons for the specific instances of the spread, but it's important to realise that this only tells us the detail of how.

It fails to assist our understanding of "why" infection blossoms.

Compare this to the early rigorous quarantining of visitors from China.

Quick action, strong policy and effective implementation - mission, leadership, and organisation - produced decisive results.

Leave out any part of this trifecta and everything falls apart.

That's why the moment Morrison backtracked and didn't go to the game was critical.

He finally understood that the mission was to communicate the need for isolation.

This meant the leadership (including the CMO) could, finally, show the way.

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Nevertheless implementing this urgency took time to flow through the bureaucracy, with the result that the peak in cases occurred roughly a fortnight later.

That delay represented the time it took organisations to catch up, understand the mission, and follow the leadership.

Contrast the situation here with the US.

Words matter.

President Trump signalled, repeatedly, that this virus "will just go away".

He didn't understand the mission and failed to communicate it; of course the bureaucracy didn't implement effective control mechanisms.

The result was a completely unnecessary pandemic which grabbed hold of the country and sent it plunging toward disaster.

A similar typology can be imposed on what happened in Afghanistan.

This is no excuse for individual failure or illegal acts.

If we want, however, to avoid disaster in future we need to clearly and analytically examine the why behind what occurred and what went wrong.

Such evidence may not be admissible in a court martial but it's a good way of understanding how bad things happen.