This revelation of a foreign government directing an attack on an Australian institution should be a wake-up call whether you like, dislike or don't know ASPI.

This is not espionage, a practice all nations do in spying against each other, nor a case of commercial or analytical competition, nor simply a government disagreeing with criticism.

This is a major authoritarian power trying to intimidate, and interfere in, Australia's capacity to have open enquiry and debate about the most important of issues-our national security. It is an attack on fundamental principles that underpin a healthy democracy.

As reported, "this is the first time a cyber offensive against Australia has been publicly attributed to written directives for intelligence activity sponsored by the Chinese government", though we know China has been responsible for the majority of state-sponsored cyber intrusions against Australia, from the Bureau of Meteorology to the Department of Parliamentary Services.

So why is the Chinese Communist Party targeting ASPI?

ASPI, while independent from government direction, is a Commonwealth company in which the federal government-and specifically the defence minister - is the sole shareholder. We are partly funded by the Defence Department.

Founded in 2001, ASPI's mission is to help provide contestability of views to the Australian government and to the Australian public.

ASPI focuses on strategic security matters, including defence strategy, military capability, critical technologies and cybersecurity, climate, counter-terrorism, foreign interference, and hybrid threats such as disinformation. Where relevant, we critique the actions of foreign governments as well as Australia's.

While no government likes being criticised, liberal democracies such as Australia's don't punish and intimidate those who express different views-indeed as successive Australian governments' support for ASPI since it was established in 2001 has shown, alternative views are encouraged when they improve debate and policymaking.

Beijing takes a different approach.

Some of our research simply assesses the strategic implications of China's growing strength in areas such as critical technology and military capability. Importantly, our analysts go where the evidence takes them and this has resulted in the exposure of malicious Chinese government actions - such as human rights abuses and methods of propaganda and disinformation.

Our work has been cited by the United Nations Human Rights Office in its 2022 report on Xinjiang, used by the Australian government in the development of foreign interference laws and in consideration of how to manage "high risk vendors" such as China's Huawei in our 5G critical infrastructure.

This transparency and contestability runs counter to Beijing's strategic aims, which is to have the obeisance of nations like Australia-a US ally and significant regional power.

Those who do not obey are coerced. Beijing has used its diplomatic heft, state-controlled media and proxies to spread propaganda and disinformation about ASPI, to list ASPI as one of the infamous 14 grievances it said needed removing to improve bilateral relations (along with a free news media), and to intimidate our staff (in particular female analysts of Asian descent) both physically and online.

This latest report of Beijing hiring cyber hackers is a sinister attempt to not just intimidate ASPI but interfere in Australian democracy.

Media should be interested and the government should make clear, directly to the Chinese government and generally to the Australian public, that attacks on Australian institutions, whether ASPI or others, are unacceptable breaches of international norms in the same category as use of cyberspace to steal intellectual property for commercial gain and arbitrary detention of Australian citizens.

If this were not the case, the message would be that Australia tolerates a foreign government, its intelligence service and criminal proxies attacking any Australian company and organisation.

We should not let criticism of malign authoritarian behaviour be silenced or deterred, including that by Beijing. Remember, China is actively supporting Russia's war on Ukraine and it is actively targeting any country that is not simply complying with its strategic view of the world.

This includes Australia, despite improvement in relations, but also India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Lithuania and any European Union member who dares have their own views.

ASPI will continue calling out activity that is harmful to Australian security regardless of its source and ensure the Australian system is held to account in its engagement with authoritarian regimes.

Yes, engagement should be supported but it must be clear-eyed. Just as it is in our interests to have an embassy in Tehran while still being able to condemn Iran for its attacks on Israel and being open that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, so too must we ensure that trade with China doesn't result in closed eyes to the reality of the Chinese Communist Party.

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Understandably, governments must at times be cautious in publicly admonishing other governments. That's why civil society will always have a role, with ASPI and others able to call out behaviour in a way governments can't, or should but don't.

Readers don't have to agree with everything ASPI writes but Australia's approach ought to follow Evelyn Beatrice Hall's description of Voltaire's thesis: "I disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it".

ASPI will protect our systems and staff and continue to do the research so clearly in the interests of Australia's security and democratic values everywhere.

But Australia needs to call out and resist this behaviour whenever and wherever it happens, even if it causes a bit of diplomatic friction. That's what managing differences requires.

Otherwise, who's next?