It was appointed to discover who was responsible for the robodebt scheme, the advice that developed it, its implementation, costs and harm to those targeted.

There is much already to learn from the commission's open public hearings - one of the virtues of such inquiries.

Whatever the political motivations were in appointing this royal commission it was suggested that it would inevitably identify senior public servants, the quality of advice they offered and possibly bring the public service into disrepute.

Indeed, it has, and more.

It has highlighted serious flaws in how a major national policy was developed, processed through cabinet and then implemented despite issues concerning its legality, efficacy, and effectiveness having not been properly addressed.

We heard from witnesses how competitive life is between departments and between departmental secretaries with some seemingly undermining others.

The hearings showed the consequences of the loss of permanent tenure for departmental secretaries and senior managers now mostly on contract.

Also, on display were some of the worse aspects of bureaucratic buck-passing, while failing to report their concerns having moved to a different part of the public service and thus it was "not their responsibility" - more colloquially known as NMP - not my problem.

Indeed, the royal commission uncovered a culture where staff were discouraged from informing senior management and even ministers in face-to-face meetings of the scheme's problems.

Such obeisance to the hierarchy and those in authority has its place, but it meant that those who knew could not communicate freely to those who didn't.

Missing in action were the central agencies like that great interfering, know-it-all, Prime Minister's Department supposedly in charge of whole of government coordination or the Finance Department, the guardian of the public purse.

Institutional failure extended, it seems, even to the Commonwealth Ombudsman who while denied the files by departments did not press hard enough, was too timid to express even a modest concern about the legality of the scheme despite its suspicions.

The commission's findings on ministerial responsibly or the possible the lack thereof, will no doubt be one the highlights of the report.

Did the parade of different ministers know what was going on and fail to act? Did ministers meet the standard test, "I did not know, I was not told, I should have asked"?

Regardless of the final report, this royal commission has already done lasting political damage to the Coalition - to its very legitimacy to govern. Certainly, more damage than previous Coalition inquiries into Labor administrations.

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This is because this royal commission has revealed real evidence of maladministration, waste, political interference, incompetence and indifference to people on such a large scale.

Its real impact, though, is how it has highlighted long running concerns about the Australian public service. This includes its increasing politicisation, the loss of permanent tenure, disappearance of an independent central personnel body, its over-responsiveness to its political masters and how power has moved too much to the ministerial office.

While the royal commission's final report will address the robodebt issue, the wider problems and behaviours it smoked out go beyond its narrow remit.

They are issues that go beyond both the Coalition and the robodebt program but are entwined and embedded in our current system of government which both sides of politics have nurtured and exploited to their advantage over the years.

No single royal commission can address all those issues. It will require more wide-ranging changes.

The Albanese government may have nailed the Coalition on the robodebt program, but in so doing has inadvertently exposed wider problems and given itself a task that any incumbent government will find difficult to address as any reforms must mean greater transparency and less political control.

Is the Albanese government up for it?