Presented with a fully argued case for reform by a non-partisan committee chaired by one of its own, Western Australian Senator Linda Reynolds, the Prime Minister and senior ministers shut down the prospect of broader community discussion by immediately ruling out a referendum. The reasons given by the PM were that there is no time before the next election and that, anyway, “I very much doubt whether Australians would support a change to the constitution to allow people with dual nationality to sit in the parliament”. Senator Reynolds retorted that Parliament “should never be afraid of debate and putting these questions to the Australian public”.

We have come a long way as a nation since the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s when governments and oppositions had an open mind about s. 128, which lays out the way the parliament can ask the people in a referendum to support the altering of the 1901 constitution where a strong case can be made.

In the 1990s the Constitutional Centenary Foundation, chaired by the former Governor-General, Sir Ninian Stephen, was set up with government funding to preside over community debate. There was a buzz in the air. As part of its efforts hundreds of Local Constitutional Conventions were held in communities across the country. I remember chairing lively constitutional discussions in Cooma and Nowra. Those were the days of enthusiasm for reform not closed minds.

The Federation Fathers included s. 128 because they recognised that there would be a later need for considered change. They had experienced referenda themselves in the 1890s when the people supported the formation of the new Commonwealth of Australia from separate British colonies, so this was the mechanism they chose to include in the new constitution.

Successive governments subsequently took 44 proposals in all to the people and, although only eight were successful, parliaments continually discussed constitutional reforms and regularly put suggestions to the electorate.

That showed a healthy predisposition to rise above the daily trench-warfare of the political party battle to think about bigger issues as well as technical or minor changes. The 1977 proposals included inserting a retirement age for High Court judges. The 1988 proposals included an unsuccessful attempt to extend protection for freedom of religion as well as other rights and freedoms. The unsuccessful 1999 referendum questions related to a republican head of state and a new preamble.

Some of these were clearly big structural issues, while others with hindsight look pretty small beer. But they are all evidence of a living Constitution. Constitutional reform should be about both types, unless it is to be reduced to a dead letter sitting on a shelf in the Australian Archives or the Museum of Australian Democracy. S. 44 reform could be approached as either a root and branch bigger change addressing its undemocratic features or as a smaller tweak which, for instance, would prevent a dual citizen once elected from sitting in the Parliament until the dual citizenship in question was dealt with (rather than even nominating to stand as is currently the case). This would reduce significantly the number of candidates potentially caught up by s. 44.

Closed minds on constitutional reform are widespread though not universal. Bill Shorten supports republican constitutional reform if elected at the next election and is somewhat more open on other matters. But the Government is naturally the main game because it sets the tone.

Some of the closure may be explained by the personal experience of the current leadership. The Prime Minister is quick to close off options because of his own experience in 1999. According to Senator Pat Dodson, reflecting on the possibilities for Indigenous constitutional recognition, Turnbull carries the scars of defeat in 1999 and has been “spooked”, leading to him rejecting the reform proposed by the Uluru Statement as having “zero chance” of success in a referendum.

But systemic explanations are more important than individual ones. The most significant difference between the referendum era, 1970-1999, and the present-day ice-age of non-reform is the standing of parliamentarians in the community. It is now so low that politicians are scared to put their status and reputation on the line with the community for fear of being rebuffed. Confident political leaders would back themselves to put a case for reform to the community when they themselves are convinced of the arguments. Tentative political leaders prematurely hoist the white flag of surrender before the serious conversation has begun.

What is needed initially from political leaders and other parliamentarians is a clear statement on where they stand on the merits of constitutional reform proposals not a strategic assessment of their likelihood of success or the practicalities of when a referendum might conveniently be held. Instead political leaders are inclined to bunker down behind secondary considerations leaving the community in the dark about their personal position.

There are some issues already on the table and others will continue to emerge. One of the latter may be the matter of religious freedoms as articulated by the yet-to-be released Ruddock Review. Whatever the issue the open-ness of previous decades is preferable to shutting up shop forever on constitutional reform.

John Warhurst is an Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University